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The Causation Standard in Federal
Employment Law:
Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., and the
Unfulfilled Promise of the Civil Rights Act of
1991
MICHAEL C. HARPER†
INTRODUCTION
In some extraordinary cases, the Supreme Court’s
assertion of unrestrained judicial authority through
interpretation of a federal statute may almost demand a
congressional response. The Roberts Court’s remarkable
2009 decision in Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc.,1
formulating a necessary or “but-for” causation standard for
actionable intentional discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),2 is such
a case. By reading governing language in the ADEA
differently than how the Court in 1989 had interpreted
identical language in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 (Title VII),3 the decision in Gross asserts the current
Court’s independence from a prior Court’s interpretive
judgment in a governing precedent.4 Moreover, by ignoring
† Professor of Law and Barreca Labor Relations Scholar, Boston University
School of Law. I thank my research assistants, Michaela May and Gourdin
Sirles, and the Boston University School of Law for supporting my research and
writing.
1. 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009).
2. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-633a (2006).
3. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (interpreting 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2006)), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of
1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1027.
4. See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 107(a), 105 Stat. 1075
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006)) (“[A]n unlawful employment practice
is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment
practice, even though other factors also motivated the practice.”).
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the likely expectations and intent of Congress as expressed
in its legislative response to that precedent, Gross seems to
reject the use of past interpretations as the basis for a
dialogue with Congress to ensure the alignment of future
judicial interpretations with legislative intent. Instead, the
Court in Gross effectively claims authority to interpret the
meaning of the governing words in the ADEA abstracted
from any consideration of likely congressional intent.
Notwithstanding the Roberts Court’s apparent
disinterest in a cooperative dialogue with the legislative
branch, a Congress committed to the original promise of the
ADEA must respond. Congress may do so as it responded to
the precedent-setting 1989 Title VII decision, Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins,5 which the Court rejected in Gross.
In § 107 of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (1991 Act),6
Congress enacted a contributing or “motivating” cause
standard for establishing liability for intentional
discrimination under Title VII, while allowing employers
the opportunity to avoid most forms of individual relief to
discrimination victims―but not to escape liability altogether
as did Price Waterhouse―by proving the absence of “but-for”
causation.7 Congress could respond directly to the Court’s
recalcitrance in Gross by enacting an identical “motivating”
factor provision for the ADEA,8 perhaps as one of several
amendments to strengthen the age discrimination statute.
Furthermore, to avert future decisions like Gross, Congress
could also add “motivating factor” provisions to other
federal statutes, such as the Americans with Disabilities
Act (ADA)9 and the Family and Medical Leave Act
(FMLA)10, which the current Court presumably would read
to require proof of necessary or “but-for” causation. Indeed,
Congress might consider clarifying the applicability of a
contributing or “motivating” factor causation standard to

5. 490 U.S. 228.
6. See § 107(a).
7. Id.
8. A form of such legislation was introduced in both Houses of Congress
several months after the decision in Gross. See S. 1756, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R.
3721, 111th Cong. (2009); discussion infra note 271.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213.
10. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2006).
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the various anti-retaliation provisions in all federal
employment statutes.11
Using § 107 as a model for amendments to other federal
employment statutes would seem attractive to those in
Congress concerned about the difficulty of proving
intentional discrimination on the basis of either a protected
status, such as older age, or against protected activity, such
as the assertion of some statutory right like freedom from
status discrimination or family or medical leave. While the
core meaning of forbidden intentional employment
discrimination is clear—considering or taking into account,
at least to some degree, a forbidden status category or
activity12—proving that such consideration actually occurred
within the conscious, or unconscious,13 thought processes of
11. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1514A (2006)
(prohibiting discrimination against employees of publicly traded companies who
report suspected violations of securities law); Federal Juror System
Improvement Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1875 (2006) (amended 2008) (protecting jurors’
employment); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 (OSHA), 29 U.S.C. §
660 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against employees who make complaints
or sue under OSHA); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA), 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (2006) (prohibiting discrimination against
beneficiaries and participants of ERISA plans for enforcing rights under that
statute). Legislation introduced in Congress in October, 2009, to overturn the
Gross decision would extend the “motivating” cause standard to “the exercise of
any right established by Federal law.” S. 1756, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009); H.R.
3721, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009); discussion infra note 271.
12. The Court, for instance, has made clear in numerous decisions that Title
VII liability requires proof only of consideration, not animus toward, plaintiff’s
protected status. See, e.g., Int’l Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S.
187, 199 (1991) (“[A]bsence of a malevolent motive does not convert a facially
discriminatory policy into a neutral policy . . . .”); Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,
482 U.S. 656, 668-69 (1987) (finding that a union cannot take into account race
in deciding how to process grievance despite lack of “racial animus” or
denigration of blacks); L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702,
708-09 (1978) (finding that actuarially sound nature of gender-based insurance
tables does not justify their adoption to determine pension contributions). See
generally Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. REV.
233, 298-99 (1971).
13. See generally Melissa Hart, Subjective Decisionmaking and Unconscious
Discrimination, 56 ALA. L. REV. 741 (2005); Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Content of Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and
Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (1995); Charles R.
Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with
Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 328-44 (1987).
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decision makers is usually problematic.14 Section 107 of the
1991 Act promised to ease the burden of proving illegal
intentional discrimination by clarifying that a Title VII
plaintiff must prove only that the consideration of one or
more of the five Title VII-forbidden status categories (race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin) “was a motivating
factor” for the challenged employment decision; the
claimant, the 1991 Act made clear, need not prove that the
consideration was a necessary or sufficient cause of the
decision.15
This clarification promised to be particularly important
for the ordinary employee, who has less than an
unblemished record and who could be faced with the burden
of untangling the threads of possible multiple motivations
for an adverse employment decision. Furthermore, whether
consideration of a forbidden category was a motivating
factor in any employment decision is a question of fact that
usually turns in part on the credibility of witnesses; it
therefore would seem that under § 107’s standard most
serious claims of intentional illegal discrimination should
14. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)
(“There will seldom be ‘eyewitness’ testimony as to the employer’s mental
processes.”). A range of empirical studies have demonstrated the special
difficulties that plaintiffs have had successfully litigating employment
discrimination claims. See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How
Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 429, 454-56 (2004) (finding that employment discrimination
plaintiffs lose at a greater rate than plaintiffs before, during, and after trial,
including on appeal); David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An
Empirical Study of California Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge Jury
Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 511 (2003); Michael Selmi, Why are Employment Discrimination Cases So
Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 558-60 (2001) (finding that employee
discrimination plaintiffs success rate are below that of other plaintiffs in federal
courts); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates
Over Time, Across Case Categories, and Across Districts: An Empirical Study of
Three Large Federal Districts (Cornell Law Sch., Research Paper No. 08-022,
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1138373
(finding higher summary judgment rates for employment discrimination cases).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). In Price Waterhouse the Court had held
that while a Title VII plaintiff must prove only contributing causation, a
defendant may avoid liability by proving that it would have made the “same
decision” in the absence of its consideration of a protected status. 490 U.S. 228,
258 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1074; see also id. at 259 (White, J., concurring).
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not be taken from juries on motions for summary judgment
or directed verdicts. Although § 107 of the 1991 Act also
provided that an employer that proves that the illegal
consideration was not a necessary cause of the challenged
decision avoids any legal or equitable remedies requiring
payments to or the hiring of complainants,16 the
establishment of “the motivating factor,” contributory
causation standard for basic Title VII liability promised to
be significant. By allowing the award of attorneys’ fees to
plaintiffs for cases in which they could prove contributing
causation, regardless of the employer’s success in limiting
other remedies,17 the “motivating factor” causation standard
promised to make the threat of litigation more realistic in
more cases and thus to affect employers’ calculations of
rational settlement.
Congress, however, should not use § 107 as a model for
a legislative response to the Court’s decision in Gross. It
should not do so because the federal judiciary has
interpreted § 107 in ways that significantly compromise the
section’s promise of making the difficult proof of illegal
intentional discrimination somewhat easier.18 The lower
federal courts have compromised this promise both by
limiting the reach of § 107’s “motivating factor” causation
standard, and—through the misuse of legal doctrine
fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green19 and Texas Department of Community
Affairs v. Burdine20 to assist plaintiffs—by denying juries
authority to find illegal “motivating factor” causation.21 The
Supreme Court’s 2003 decision in Desert Palace, Inc. v.
Costa,22 especially when read with the Court’s decision three
years before in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products,

16. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
17. See § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i).
18. See infra text accompanying notes 167-203, 223-50.
19. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
20. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
21. Many lower courts also have frustrated the promise of the 1991 Act by
denying or reducing the award of attorneys’ fees when employers successfully
prove that they would have made the same decision in the absence of illegal
discrimination. See infra note 111 and cases cited therein.
22. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
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Inc.,23 seemed to revive the 1991 Act’s promise by rejecting a
limitation on the reach of the “motivating factor” standard.
Lower courts’ interpretations of Desert Palace, however,
have been generally narrow; these interpretations continue
to limit the reach of § 107 and to use the Court’s McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine framework to restrict juries’ discretion to
find “motivating factor” causation.24
Before responding to Gross in an amendment to the
ADEA, or to any other federal employment statute,
legislative drafters should understand the history of the
judiciary’s treatment of causation under the federal antidiscrimination in employment laws. They should
understand
the
Price
Waterhouse
decision,
the
Congressional response to that decision in § 107, and how
courts have compromised that response. Such an
understanding is necessary if the Congressional response to
Gross is to be more effective than was the response to Price
Waterhouse.
This Article is framed to provide this understanding.
Part I provides an analysis of the Court’s treatment of
causation in Title VII decisions through Price Waterhouse.
This part also analyzes the congressional response in § 107.
Part II explains how the lower courts chose to treat the
causation issue in ADEA cases after Price Waterhouse and
the 1991 Act, and then highlights how the Supreme Court
made a remarkably different choice in Gross. The analyses
in Parts I and II demonstrate why members of Congress
who want the ADEA to be a strong tool against age
discrimination in employment would want to overturn that
decision. Part III indicates why Congress should not do so
simply by adding to the ADEA a provision like § 107 of the
1991 Act. This part explains how the lower courts, both
before and even after Desert Palace, have narrowed the
scope of § 107 by interpreting it to provide a separate cause
of action, rather than a causation standard for all Title VII
disparate treatment actions. Part IV presents a
recommendation for how Congress could more effectively
formulate a contributing or motivating cause standard not
only for anti-discrimination law mandates like those in the
ADEA and Title VII, but also for other federal employment
law prohibitions. Part IV also explains further why a
23. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 223-50.
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contributing cause standard is consistent with the
consideration of the pretext proof contemplated within the
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework.
I. A “MOTIVATING FACTOR” STANDARD FOR TITLE VII
A. Before Price Waterhouse
Until its decision in Price Waterhouse almost twentyfive years after the passage of Title VII, the Supreme Court
did not attempt to definitively settle the minimum causal
linkage required to establish actionable intentional
discrimination
under
any
federal
employment
discrimination law. Even before Price Waterhouse, however,
the Court in Title VII disparate treatment cases effectively
rejected two alternative possible minimum causation
standards, sole causation and sufficient causation. A sole
causation standard would require that consideration of a
forbidden category be the only reason for the challenged
employment decision. A sufficient causation standard would
require that consideration of one of the five forbidden
categories would be sufficient to determine the decision,
even if other considerations were relevant to the decision
makers. A sufficient causation linkage differs from a
necessary causation linkage; the latter requires that the
decision would not have been made but for consideration of
the linked cause, while the former requires that it would
have been made without consideration of any other causes.
For instance, if an employer rejects a female applicant for a
laboratory position because she lacks a doctorate, but would
have hired either an otherwise similar female with a
doctorate or a similar male even without a doctorate, the
woman’s gender was not a sole or a sufficient cause, but was
a necessary cause of her rejection.25
The Court’s most important early Title VII cases
treating proof of an individual instance of disparate
treatment were McDonnell Douglas and Burdine. These
25. In some cases there might be a sufficient causation linkage without a
necessary causation linkage. For instance, if the employer in the example in the
text would not consider hiring either any women or any individuals without
doctorates for the position, being a woman and lacking a doctorate both would
be sufficient causes for rejection, but neither would be a necessary cause for the
rejection of a female who lacked a doctorate.
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decisions offered plaintiffs a framework for proving
indirectly the existence of a covert motivation condemned by
Title VII by proving the implausibility of alternative legal
motivations. Central to this framework and the assistance it
offered to plaintiffs was the Court’s direction to the lower
courts to apply “a legally mandatory, rebuttable
presumption”26 of illegal discrimination if a Title VII
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case27 raising “an
inference of discrimination” by eliminating “the most
common nondiscriminatory reasons for the plaintiff’s
rejection” and the defendant employer does not offer another
“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for the challenged
decision. This mandatory presumption forced a defendant
employer that denied discriminatory motivation to specify
an alternative nondiscriminatory motivation and thus
enabled plaintiffs to attempt to prove discrimination
“indirectly by showing that the employer’s proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence” as well as “directly by
persuading the court that a discriminatory reason” existed.28
By facilitating proof of the existence of a bad motive
through proof of the absence of a good motive, the Court did
not purport to determine the degree of minimal causal
linkage between the bad motive and the adverse
employment decision challenged by the plaintiff. The
Court’s analysis in McDonnell Douglas and Burdine does
seem to reject, however, both sole and sufficient causation
as minimum standards by suggesting that proving the
employer’s “proffered explanation” to be “unworthy of
credence” or pretextual would raise an inference not that
the employer’s professed good motivation did not exist at all
or that it was not a necessary contributing cause, but only
that there was also some other cause, and thus probably an
illegal cause, for the challenged decision.29 In McDonnell
Douglas, the Court asserted that “[e]specially relevant” to a
showing in that case that the employer’s proffered
26. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 n.7 (1981).
27. Id. at 254. As stated in Burdine, to establish a prima facie case that forces
a defendant to offer a legitimate reason, the “plaintiff must prove by a
preponderance of the evidence that she applied for an available position for
which she was qualified, but was rejected under circumstances which give rise
to an inference of unlawful discrimination.” Id. at 253.
28. Id. at 256.
29. Id.
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explanation for not rehiring the plaintiff—his participation
in an unlawful obstruction of access to and egress from the
employer’s property—was a pretext for a decision motivated
by the plaintiff’s race would be evidence “that white
employees involved in acts . . . of comparable seriousness . . .
were nevertheless retained or rehired.”30 Such evidence
would only raise an inference that the employer’s fully
legitimate and credible proffered reason for not wanting to
rehire the plaintiff, his illegal conduct, was not a sufficient
consideration and thus that some other consideration, most
probably race, was also a necessary cause.31 This certainly
would not prove that the employer would no longer hire
other individuals of the plaintiff’s race, even if they were
qualified and had not participated in illegal activity against
the employer.
The Court in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co. indeed acknowledged that the Court’s
opinion three years earlier in McDonnell Douglas had
rejected a requirement of sole or sufficient causation by
stating that a legitimate consideration cannot justify also
taking into account race in an employment decision.32 In
McDonald, the Court applied this principle by holding that
the white plaintiffs’ misappropriation of cargo from their
railroad employer did not excuse their employer’s treating
an African American co-thief and employee more leniently.33
Proof that the white employees’ race was neither a sole
cause nor a sufficient cause of their discharge―proof, in
other words, that their misappropriation of the cargo was
also a necessary cause of the discharge―was no defense to
their Title VII claim.
The Court’s application in McDonnell Douglas and
McDonald of Title VII’s proscription of intentional
discrimination to decision making that takes race into
account, regardless of whether the decision making would
make race determinative as a sole or sufficient cause in the
absence of other causal factors, what might be called “race30. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
31. Proof that a particular cause is not sufficient does not prove, as a matter
of logic, that that cause was not necessary. It does prove, however, that there is
at least one other necessary cause.
32. 427 U.S. 273, 282 n.10 (1976).
33. Id. at 282-83.
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plus” discrimination, followed directly from the Court’s
earlier condemnation in Phillips v. Martin Marietta,34 of
similar “sex-plus” decision making. In Phillips the Court
held in a unanimous per curiam decision that Title VII’s
prohibition of intentional discrimination covered an
employer’s policy against hiring women, but not men, with
pre-school age children, for particular positions even though
the company had hired a disproportionate number of female
applicants
for
these
positions.35
The
company’s
disproportionate hiring of women surely proved that being
female was not the sole or sufficient cause of women with
young children being rejected, but it did not insulate the
company from liability under Title VII.36
The Court’s analysis in McDonnell Douglas might be
read to suggest that since proof of the insufficiency of a
proffered good motive would be relevant to proof of at least
a necessary causal linkage between a Title VII-condemned
consideration and a challenged employment decision, such a
linkage must be proven in all Title VII disparate treatment
cases.37 The Court’s description of possible probative
evidence in McDonnell Douglas and in Burdine, however,
indicates that the Court did not intend to require that
plaintiffs prove the insufficiency of the good motive in all
cases and thus could not have settled on necessary
causation as the minimally required linkage. In McDonnell
Douglas the Court noted other evidence that might be
relevant, but that could only prove directly the existence of
a bad discriminatory motive, rather than the absence or
insufficient force of a good motive—such as McDonnell
Douglas’s professed desire to avoid employing those who
have engaged in illegal action against it.38 This other
evidence, which had no direct relevance to McDonnell
Douglas’s professed good motive, included the employer’s
reaction to legitimate civil rights activities of employees, its
34. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
35. Id. at 544.
36. The Court did leave open the possibility of a bona fide occupational
qualification defense. Id.
37. Indeed, in McDonald the Court read McDonnell Douglas to mean that “no
more” is required than “but for cause.” 427 U.S. at 282 n.10. This reading, of
course, does not settle whether less than “but-for” necessary causation could be
sufficient in some cases.
38. McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
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“general policy and practice with respect to minority
employment” and its treatment of the plaintiff during his
prior employment.39 Moreover, in Burdine the Court stated
that a Title VII plaintiff can carry her ultimate burden of
proving that “she has been the victim of intentional
discrimination . . . either directly by persuading the court
that a discriminatory reason more likely motivated the
employer or indirectly by showing that the employer’s
proffered explanation is unworthy of credence.”40 The latter,
“indirect” method of proof might tend to prove the
nonexistence or at least the insufficiency of an alternative
motive and thus the necessity of a bad discriminatory
motive. The former, “direct” method of proof, however, only
can establish the existence of the bad motive, not the
insufficiency of a good motive. Notwithstanding the Court’s
perhaps unconsidered use of the word “more,” the relative
strength of a good motive cannot be established by proof of
the existence of a bad motive.
Regardless of the import of this analysis in McDonnell
Douglas and Burdine, the Court in other pre-Price
Waterhouse decisions made clear that the McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine framework was designed, not to force
plaintiffs to prove the insufficiency of a good motive as well
as the existence of a discriminatory motive, but rather to
offer only an option to assist plaintiffs with the difficult
proof of covert discrimination. In several cases before Price
Waterhouse, the Court treated overt sex-based policies to
constitute intentional discrimination without attempting to
shoe horn analysis into the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
framework.41 More importantly, in United States Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, the Court confirmed
that the purpose of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
framework was not to establish subsidiary legal rules to be
met before finding actionable discrimination, but only to
offer plaintiffs a way to compel employers to offer legitimate
reasons for challenged decisions and thus an opportunity for
proof of pretext.42 The Aikens Court directed courts to
39. Id.
40. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981).
41. See, e.g., Ariz. Governing Comm. v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073 (1983); L.A.
Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702 (1978); Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321 (1977).
42. 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983).
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evaluate the evidence offered in a case where intentional
discrimination is claimed only to determine “the ultimate
question” of discrimination and to not make their inquiry
even more difficult by applying legal rules which were
devised to govern “‘the basic allocation of burdens and order
of presentation of proof.’”43 Thus, the Court held that the
trial court and appellate court in Aikens had mistakenly
focused analysis on whether the plaintiff’s evidence was
adequate to establish a prima facie case sufficient to compel
the defendant to provide a legitimate motive for not
promoting the plaintiff, even after the defendant had offered
such a motive after trial: “Where the defendant has done
everything that would be required of him if the plaintiff had
properly made out a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff
really did so is no longer relevant.”44 The court, as finder of
fact at this point, is only to evaluate all the evidence to
determine the ultimate question of discrimination.45
Yet in Aikens, as in its other pre-Price Waterhouse
disparate treatment cases, the Court did not directly
separate the two parts of this ultimate question: first,
whether a forbidden status category was considered in
deciding on the challenged employment action; and second,
if it was, to what degree did the consideration cause the
action. For instance, in a footnote, the Aikens Court noted
without comment on the issue of causation the relevance of
some evidence, such as racist comments from a decision
maker and the relative treatment of other black employees,
that could help prove that race was considered during
decisions not to promote the plaintiff without proving that it
was a necessary cause of those decisions.46 Thus, while the
decision in Aikens confirmed that McDonnell Douglas and
Burdine should be read only as a means of compelling a
defendant to explain a challenged decision, and not as
interpretations of the underlying meaning of Title VII’s
proscription of intentional discrimination, including the
minimum causal linkage it embodies, Aikens did not offer a
resolution of the causation issue.

43. Id. (quoting Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252).
44. Id. at 715.
45. Id. at 716-17.
46. Id. at 713 n.2.
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Not surprisingly, therefore, before Price Waterhouse the
circuit courts of appeal had not reached a consensus on the
issue of the minimum causal linkage required to prove
actionable intentional discrimination in a Title VII case.
Although no courts of appeals required that plaintiffs prove
sole or sufficient causation, the courts split between
requiring proof of necessary or but-for causation and
requiring proof of some lesser, and perhaps less well
defined, linkage such as “substantial” or “significant” or
“discernible” “motivating” factor in the employment
decision.47 Some of the courts that did not require plaintiffs
to prove necessary causation did allow defendants to prove
the absence of such causation—to prove, in other words,
that the same decision would have been made “but for”
consideration of the plaintiff’s forbidden status category—as
a defense to liability or as a basis for limiting relief.48
B. Price Waterhouse
The Court thus granted certiorari in Price Waterhouse
v. Hopkins in part at least for the purpose of finally and
directly resolving the causation issue that it had avoided in
the two and a half decades since the passage of Title VII.49
The result was the publication of four opinions on the issue,
none of which commanded the assent of more than four
Justices and no two of which commanded the assent of the
47. Compare McQuillen v. Wis. Educ. Ass’n Council, 830 F.2d 659, 664 (7th
Cir. 1988) (requiring “but-for” causation), and Lewis v. Univ. of Pittsburgh, 725
F.2d 910, 914 (3d Cir. 1983) (same), and Mack v. Cape Elizabeth Sch. Bd., 553
F.2d 720, 722 (1st Cir. 1977) (same), with Walsdorf v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 857 F.2d
1047, 1052 (5th Cir. 1988) (requiring the illegal motive to be a “significant
factor”), and Fadhl v. City and County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163, 1166
(9th Cir. 1984) (same).
48. See, e.g., Haskins v. U.S. Dep’t of Army, 808 F.2d 1192, 1197-98 (6th Cir.
1987) (requiring the illegal motive to have been a “motivating factor” but
allowing defendant to limit the remedy by proving that it would have made the
same decision absent the illegal motive); Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1323-24
(8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (holding that if the “unlawful motive played some part
in the employment decision or decisional process, the plaintiff is entitled to some
relief” but allowing defendant to avoid back pay and reinstatement by showing
that it would have made the same decision in the absence of the illegal motive
(emphasis added)).
49. 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see also Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 825 F.2d 458
(D.C. Cir. 1987), rev’d, 490 U.S. 228.
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same Justice. A four-Justice plurality concluded that the
statute’s proscription of discrimination should be
interpreted to require proof of only a “motivating” cause
linkage, but then afforded employers an affirmative defense
to avoid liability by showing that discrimination was not a
necessary cause.50 A three-Justice dissenting opinion would
have held that the statute required plaintiffs to prove
necessary causation.51 Justice O’Connor, in an opinion only
for herself, agreed with the dissenters that the statute
required a necessary causation linkage, but asserted that in
some cases such a linkage can be shown by a plaintiff’s
“strong” proof of “substantial” causation, unless the
defendant cannot prove the absence of necessary
causation.52 Justice White, in another individual
concurrence, described the difference between the plurality
and Justice O’Connor as “semantic” and stated that he
could accept either approach because both were consistent
with the Court’s protection of public employees’ First
Amendment rights from public-employer retaliation.53
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Kennedy
for himself, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justice Scalia,
advances unconvincing arguments for finding a necessary
causation linkage requirement in the statute. Justice
Kennedy first asserted that the words “because of” in the
statute’s proscription of discrimination “because of such
individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin”
should be presumed to have the plain meaning of “everyday
speech.”54 Citing a statement in an interpretive
memorandum for Title VII in the Congressional Record for
support of the “everyday speech” standard, Justice Kennedy
claimed that in everyday speech “because of” means “to
make a difference.”55 In fact, our speech and our notions of
causation are much more complicated than Justice Kennedy
allowed. As pointed out by the plurality, for instance, where
50. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45 (plurality).
51. Id. at 284 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Discrimination need not be the sole
cause in order for liability to arise, but merely a necessary element of the set of
factors that caused the decision, i.e., a but-for cause.”).
52. Id. at 276-78 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
53. Id. at 258-59 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
54. Id. at 281 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
55. Id.
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there are two independently sufficient causes for an action,
in everyday speech we would treat each as a cause of the
action, a cause that “made a difference,” though neither
would be a necessary cause.56 Thus, most of us would state
that where an employer refuses to hire either women or
blacks, the employer’s refusal to hire a black woman is
caused by its consideration of both sex and race. Consider
also an employer who refuses to promote to a managerial
position any woman who has young children, any black
woman, or any black who has young children. If a black
woman with a young child is denied a promotion, most of us
in our everyday speech would state that being black and
being a woman both made a difference and both were causes
of the denial. Yet neither race nor sex was a necessary or a
sufficient cause. Most of us in our everyday speech indeed
probably use cause, or the phrase “make a difference,” in
the sense of contributing cause, a factor that has some
relevance to the outcome, or in the case of a decision, such
as a personnel decision, is taken into account.
Justice Kennedy’s other affirmative arguments for
requiring a necessary causation linkage are equally
unconvincing.57 The few phrases relevant to causation that
he drew from earlier opinions does not address whether the
statute required necessary causation.58 His reliance on the
common law of torts requiring a “but-for” or necessary
causation linkage as a minimum condition for imposing
liability ignores the broader public purposes of Title VII.59
While the tort system is designed to provide for appropriate
compensation and efficient deterrence of costly actions, Title
56. Id. (plurality).
57. Justice Kennedy’s criticism of the “inconsistency” of the plurality opinion,
however, was more compelling. Id at 285-86 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see also
infra text accompanying note 76.
58. None of the quotations even addressed whether the level of causation to
which they referred was required by the statute as a minimal standard, and
only one, from Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S.
669, 683 (1983), used the language of “but-for” causation to make clear the level
of causation found by the Court. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 282
(Kennedy, J., dissenting). Furthermore, Newport News was not a directly
relevant precedent because it involved an overt policy of differential treatment
that the Court found to discriminate on the basis of sex, rather than an inquiry
into tangled covert motivations. 462 U.S. at 683-84.
59. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 282 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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VII also represents a public condemnation of decision
making affected by certain forms of discriminatory bias.
Determining the meaning of the ambiguous “because of”
phrase in § 703(a)(1) cannot rely on common law precedents
any more than it can rely on an interpretation of “everyday
speech”; it requires an analysis of this public purpose and
the difficulty of proof of discriminatory motivation.60
Justice Brennan’s Price Waterhouse plurality opinion, in
which Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined,
unfortunately does not provide such analysis in reaching its
dual conclusions that plaintiffs must prove only that
consideration of a Title VII-forbidden factor played a
“motivating part”61 in a challenged decision, but that
defendants can avoid liability by proving that they would
have made the same decisions “but for” the forbidden
consideration.62 To set the “motivating” factor causation
standard, Justice Brennan did little more than note the
ambiguity in the statutory phrase and cite the broad
coverage of the Act through the unjustified effects-based
disparate impact theory of proof and the narrow bona fide
occupational qualification (BFOQ) defense,63 neither of
which has any particular relevance to the causation issue in
disparate treatment litigation. Justice Brennan did not
60. Furthermore, the law of torts does not always apply a simple requirement
that plaintiffs prove necessary causation. For instance, two parties responsible
for two independent physical actions, such as two separate but merging forest
fires, each of which was sufficient to cause injury to a third party, can both be
liable to the third party for the injuries, though the actions of neither was a
necessary cause of the injuries. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 432(2)
(1965) (“If two forces are actively operating, one because of the actor’s
negligence, the other not because of any misconduct on his part, and each of
itself is sufficient to bring about harm to another, the actor’s negligence may be
found to be a substantial factor in bringing it about.”); FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL.,
HARPER, JAMES AND GRAY ON TORTS, § 20.3 (3d ed. 2007). Moreover, if a plaintiff
can demonstrate that his injury was caused by one of two independent negligent
actions by separate parties, each party may be liable unless she can prove that
her action did not cause the injury. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra,
§ 433B(2); HARPER ET AL., supra, § 20.2.
61. 490 U.S. at 250 (plurality).
62. Id. at 244-45.
63. See id. at 243-44. The BFOQ defense, which applies “where religion, sex,
or national origin is a bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of [the] particular business or enterprise,” is codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006).
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discuss the particular difficulties plaintiffs might have
proving the relative weights of entangled motives and
whether those difficulties might discourage attorneys
bringing actions even against many personnel actions that
would not have been taken but for discriminatory bias. He
also did not discuss whether the public purposes of Title VII
would be served by encouraging plaintiffs to bring actions to
condemn and discourage, at least through the imposition of
litigation costs, decision making tainted by such bias,
regardless of whether the bias could be shown to have
affected decisions in particular cases.
Justice Brennan expended more words attempting to
justify the affirmative defense to liability he afforded
employers who could prove—hypothetically—that they
would have made the same decisions but for the
discriminatory bias that they took into account in their
actual decisions. He did so by citing other defenses, such as
the BFOQ,64 legislative history indicating that Congress
wanted to protect employers’ personnel discretion in the
absence of discriminatory bias,65 the first amendment case
found particularly relevant by Justice White,66 and Courtapproved precedent formulated by the National Labor
Relations Board.67 He did not cite any particular provision
or language in the statute on which this affirmative defense
can rest or any delegated legislative authority to formulate
an affirmative defense that is not an interpretation of
particular statutory language. The dissent correctly
criticizes the plurality opinion’s legal basis for its claimed
authority to formulate this defense, for treading a path “in
the wrong forest”; and the dissent also fairly opines that
what the plurality’s formulation effectively accomplishes is
the adoption of a “necessary causation” standard, with a
shift of the burden of proof on the standard to the employer

64. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 242-43.
65. Id. at 243-44.
66. Id. at 248-49; see also Mt. Healthy City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S.
274 (1977).
67. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 249. See NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462
U.S. 393, 402-03 (1983) (holding use of burden shifting on causation issue in
discrimination cases to be within the discretion of the National Labor Relations
Board).
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whenever a plaintiff can prove that a discriminatory motive
existed.68
As the dissent acknowledges,69 Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence is more consistent than is the plurality decision
because it expressly finds a necessary causation standard in
§ 703(a)(1) and then shifts the burden on to defendants to
prove the absence of such causation in a limited group of
cases.70 Her reasons for finding a necessary causation
standard in the statute—finding the statute’s “plain
language” unambiguous and drawing a dubious inference
from some unrevealing legislative history71—are no more
compelling than the reasons for the same interpretation
offered by the dissent or the “motivating factor”
interpretation of the same statutory language by the
plurality. Justice O’Connor, however, did offer a more
persuasive analysis of why the burden of proof on necessary
causation should at least in some cases be placed on
defendants. Justice O’Connor noted that in cases involving
entangled multiple motives the common law of torts, in fact,
does sometimes reverse the burden of proof to defendants on
the causation issue because not doing so would demand “the
impossible” from plaintiffs.72 She also noted “mounting
evidence in the decisions of the lower courts” that in many
Title VII cases a plaintiff, like the unsuccessful female
applicant for a partnership in the case at bar, does not have
the ability to untangle the threads of multiple causation.73
Furthermore, Justice O’Connor explained why reversing
the burden of proof is necessary to ensure fulfillment of the
goals of Title VII. These goals, she noted, in addition to
compensation to the victims of discrimination, include
causing employers to “‘endeavor to eliminate, so far as
possible, the last vestiges’ of discrimination in
employment.”74 “There is no doubt,” she allowed:
68. 490 U.S. at 289 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 290.
70. See id. at 269 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
71. Id. at 262.
72. Id. at 264.
73. Id. at 273.
74. Id. at 264-65 (quoting Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 41718 (1975).
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that Congress considered reliance on gender or race in making
employment decisions an evil in itself. . . . Reliance on such factors
is exactly what the threat of Title VII liability was meant to
deter[, as] . . . Congress was certainly not blind to the stigmatic
harm which comes from being evaluated by a process which treats
one as an inferior by reason of one’s race or sex.75

To serve this goal of deterrence, Justice O’Connor
concluded, it is appropriate at least to eliminate a
“presumption of good faith” to penalize employers where
plaintiffs have proven that an illegitimate criterion was a
“substantial” factor in an adverse employment decision.76
Because of the costs and risks of litigation, the penalty of
having to prove the absence of necessary causation has a
monetary deterrent value for employers who allow
consideration of a forbidden status category. Justice
O’Connor’s opinion thus recognizes the value to plaintiffs
and to the deterrent goals of Title VII of plaintiffs having to
prove only that the illegitimate criterion was a “substantial
factor” in a challenged decision, even where employers can
defeat liability by proving that the same decision would
have been made in the absence of consideration of the
factor.
Justice O’Connor’s opinion becomes much less clear and
persuasive, however, when it attempts to define the cases in
which it is appropriate to shift the burden of proof to
defendants on the issue of necessary causation, and in so
doing attempts to distinguish the framework she favored
from that advanced by the plurality. First, while Justice
O’Connor placed much stress on the word “substantial” as
important to the minimum causal linkage she would
require, it is not clear that any meaningful distinction can
be drawn between a contributing or “motivating” factor and
a “substantial factor” Once a requirement of necessary
causation is set aside, what does it mean for a factor to be
taken into account as a basis for a decision, but not in a

75. Id. at 265.
76. Id. at 265-66. The Court had established a similar burden-shifting
presumption that a particular individual member of a class was the victim of a
pattern or practice of discrimination that plaintiffs prove existed. See Int’l Bhd.
of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 361 (1977); Franks v. Bowman
Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 772-73 (1976).
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substantial way?77 Justice O’Connor asserted that for a
factor to be “substantial . . . a reasonable fact finder” must
be able to “draw an inference” that the factor was a
necessary cause of the decision.78 Any evidence sufficient to
support an inference that the factor played a role in actually
motivating the decision, however, logically would support
an inference that it was a necessary cause of the decision in
the absence of any evidence that other legitimate factors
existed, and under Justice O’Connor’s own framework,
proving legitimate motives is for defendants. Justice
O’Connor suggests that “a mere reference to ‘a lady
candidate’ might show that gender ‘played a role’ in the
decision”79 without being sufficient to support an inference
of necessary causation; but there is nothing in the plurality
opinion, or in any other decision of the Court, that suggests
that mere awareness of the gender of an employee is the
kind of consideration of sex that is condemned by Title VII.
Proof of motivation requires proof of more than awareness
of a protected status category; it requires proof that the
category was considered relevant to the decision.
More important to the confusion the decision ultimately
created in the lower courts, however, was Justice
O’Connor’s attempt to limit the cases to which her defense
applied to ones where the proof of discrimination is by
“direct evidence.”80 The primary source of the confusion was
Justice O’Connor’s failure to define how she intended to use
the word “direct.” In the context of a Title VII intentional
discrimination case at the time of Price Waterhouse “direct
evidence” could be reasonably used to contrast
“circumstantial evidence,” as it is in the law of evidence.
Alternatively, based on the two alternative means of
proving actionable discrimination listed in Burdine,81 the
term could be used to contrast the “indirect” evidence of
77. See Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making
Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 508 (2006)
(explaining that there is no logical distinction between a “substantial factor” and
a “motivating factor” contributory causation standard).
78. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 278 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
79. Id. at 277.
80. Id. at 276.
81. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); see
also supra text accompanying note 28.
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discrimination that proves “that the employer’s proffered
explanation is unworthy of credence.”82
Justice O’Connor’s opinion, however, does not seem to
use “direct evidence” in the former sense, as does the law of
evidence, to contrast circumstantial evidence that requires
inferences to be probative.83 The opinion never uses the
word “circumstantial” nor does it refer in any way to the law
of evidence. Furthermore, the evidence of sex discrimination
that Justice O’Connor found sufficiently “direct” to warrant
a finding that gender was a “substantial” factor in Price
Waterhouse’s denial of a partnership to Ann Hopkins was
all circumstantial; its probative value all required a fact
finder to draw from statements of decision makers
inferences about their motivation—albeit relatively clear
inferences.84
Justice O’Connor’s discussion of evidence that she did
not consider “direct,” however, also does not seem to fit with
the second alternative: the “indirect” evidence that proves
the existence of discrimination indirectly by proving “that
the employer’s proffered explanation is unworthy of
credence.”85 She agreed with the plurality that “stray
remarks in the workplace” cannot justify shifting a burden
of persuasion onto an employer.86 She also more specifically
82. 450 U.S. at 256.
83. See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 734 (Kenneth S. Brown ed., 6th ed. 2006)
(collecting cases); 1A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 25 (Tillers rev. 1983) (same).
84. Justice O’Connor found highly probative of the existence of
discriminatory motivation, that “evaluations of Ann Hopkins submitted by
partners in the firm overtly referred to her failure to conform to certain gender
stereotypes” and “the partner responsible for informing Hopkins of the factors
which caused her candidacy to be placed on hold, indicated that her
‘professional’ problems would be solved” if she walked, talked, dressed and
groomed “‘more femininely.”’ Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 272 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment). This is indeed very strong evidence that the partners’
sexual stereotyping influenced the decision to deny Hopkins a partnership, but
it is not evidence, like an eyewitness account, that directly demonstrates
motivation without the need of any logical inference. The only truly direct
evidence regarding intent are statements of the decision makers concerning
their state of mind, and such statements generally admit discriminatory intent
only in Title VII cases where the employer attempts to rely on an acceptable
defense, such as a bona fide occupational qualification or a reasonably limited
affirmative action plan.
85. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
86. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 277 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
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would find insufficient “standing alone” “statements by
nondecisionmakers, or statements by decisionmakers
unrelated to the decisional process itself,” or testimony like
that of Hopkins’ expert, on the meaning of sex-based
language at the work place.87 Yet any probative value,
however strong or weak, of any sex-based statements, or
indeed “stray remarks,” from anyone at the work place
would be “direct” in the sense of directly showing the
possible existence of an illegitimate discriminatory motive,
rather than indirectly showing such a motive by
demonstrating the absence of an illegitimate motive.
Perhaps Justice O’Connor intended only to give examples of
evidence that would be insufficiently “strong,” even if
“direct” in the Burdine sense, rather than to claim that all
relatively weak evidence is “indirect.”88 If so, it is not clear
that she intended that such weak evidence, though
insufficient “standing alone,” should be treated as irrelevant
to the question of whether a “substantial” motivation has
been proven. It is also not clear that her framework
ultimately differs from that provided by the plurality.
Justice White, in his Price Waterhouse concurring
opinion, indeed took the position that the difference
between the plurality’s affirmative defense on the one hand,
and Justice O’Connor’s embrace of “but-for” causation with
a shifting burden of proof on the other hand, is only
“semantic,” and unnecessary to be resolved.89 Justice White
instead found each approach to fit within the model
provided by the Court’s decision in Mt. Healthy City Board
of Education v. Doyle,90 governing the protection of first
87. Id.
88. Justice O’Connor never expressly characterizes the evidence that she
finds inadequate as not “direct.” Rather, she simply characterizes evidence that
she finds adequate to be “direct.” See id. Her opinion thus can be read to require
that evidence of a “substantial” motivation be “direct,” as the term is used in
Burdine, but to clarify that all such “direct” evidence will not suffice to prove
substantial motivation.
89. Id. at 258-59 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
90. 429 U.S. 274 (1977). The Court in Mt. Healthy was not completely clear
whether an employer’s “same decision” defense to plaintiffs’ claim that they
were adversely affected by their first amendment-protected expression defeated
liability or only compensatory individual remedies. See Sheldon Nahmod, Mt.
Healthy and Causation-in-Fact: The Court Still Doesn’t Get It!, 51 MERCER L.
REV. 603, 607 (2000). In an opinion confirming that the Mt. Healthy affirmative
defense is also available in equal protection cases, however, the Court stated
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amendment speech of public employees from employer
retaliation. Justice White did not elaborate further whether
he thought the plurality’s approach differed in any way
from the Mt. Healthy model, quibbling only with the
plurality’s suggestion that an employer should have to
disprove necessary causation through “objective” evidence
beyond the credible testimony of decision makers.91
Significantly, neither Justice White nor the Mt. Healthy
opinion on which he relied makes any mention of the
ambiguous “direct evidence” requirement that obfuscates
Justice O’Connor’s opinion.
Any reasonable reading of Justice O’Connor’s and
Justice White’s concurrences, therefore, would find that of
Justice White to be more easily compatible with the fourJustice plurality opinion, and thus controlling. Lower court
judges could have been reasonably expected to ignore
Justice O’Connor’s elaborate, but ambiguous sixth-vote
concurring opinion, and to look instead to the relatively
straight forward plurality opinion, modifying it only if
necessary to align with Mt. Healthy92 and with Justice
White’s insistence that there be no limitation on how
employers might prove they would have made the same
decision “but for” a discriminatory motivation.93 As is
recounted below,94 however, this reasonable expectation was
never realized.
that “where there is no allegation of an ongoing or imminent constitutional
violation to support a claim for forward-looking relief, the government’s
conclusive demonstration that it would have made the same decision absent the
alleged discrimination precludes any finding of liability.” Texas v. Lesage, 528
U.S. 18, 21 (1999) (per curiam); see also Christina B. Whitman, An Essay on
Texas v. Lesage, 51 MERCER L. REV. 621 (2000).
91. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 261 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
92. Justice White, in his concurrence quoted the critical, most instructive
passage from the Mt. Healthy decision. Id. at 259. That passage does not suggest
any modification of the plurality’s framework. Interestingly, the passage seems
to equate a “motivating factor” standard with a “substantial factor” standard:
“in this case, the burden was properly placed upon respondent to show that his
conduct was constitutionally protected, and that his conduct was a ‘substantial
factor’—or, to put it in other words, that it was a ‘motivating factor’ in [the
employer’s] decision not to rehire him.” Id. (quoting Mt. Healthy, 429 U.S. at
287).
93. See supra text accompany note 91.
94. See infra text accompany notes 126-33, 167-70.
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C. Section 107 of the 1991 Act
Section 107(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 directly
rejects the manner in which the various Price Waterhouse
opinions dealt with the issue of minimum causal linkage by
pronouncing that “an unlawful employment practice is
established when the complaining party demonstrates that
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice, even though other
factors also motivated the practice.”95 The provision thereby
rejects, in favor of a “motivating factor” standard, the
standard of necessary or but-for causation embraced by the
dissenters and by Justice O’Connor in Price Waterhouse. It
also rejects any ambiguous “substantial” qualification on
the “motivating” standard, and for purposes of establishing
liability for actionable discrimination under Title VII, any
affirmative defense through the showing of the absence of
necessary causation.
Section 107(b) offered defendants an analogous defense
to limit the remedies that can be awarded against them,
however, by proving that they “would have taken the same
action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor.”96 The remedies that are to be excluded by a
successful “same action” defense are “damages” or
“admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment”
of back wages.97 The relief that may be granted regardless of
any successful “same action” defense include “declaratory
relief, injunctive relief [that is not otherwise excluded], and
attorney’s fees and costs.”98
Section 107(a) only settled the question of causation for
pre-existing Title VII causes of action; it did not establish a
new cause of action. Section 107(a) is a congressional
interpretation of the meaning of the “because of” phrase in §
703(a)(1), as well as in other proscriptions of discrimination
95. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(a), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
96. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 107(b)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
97. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(ii).
98. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B)(i). This compromise was actually available to
the Court in Price Waterhouse given the broad discretionary language of § 706 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which allows, but does not require particular
remedies. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(2006).
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by employment agencies, labor organizations, and
apprenticeship or training programs in § 703(b), § 703(c),
and § 703(d) of the Act.99 Congress may have chosen to
establish the “motivating factor” standard by adding a
provision (m) to § 703 of Title VII, to avoid having to amend
numerous other provisions and to clarify that it wished the
“motivating” standard to pervade the statute. Perhaps
Congress also wanted to make clear its view that it was not
changing the meaning of “because of” in the original
provisions, but rather was interpreting what was meant
from the time of the passage of the Act.100 In any event,
§ 703(m) cannot stand alone as a proscription of
discrimination; it does not even independently specify the
parties upon which obligations not to discriminate are
imposed. The “any” discriminatory “employment practice” to
which it refers must be based on references to the preexisting prohibitions of discrimination in the Act. There is
nothing in the language or the legislative history of § 107 to
suggest that Congress intended to establish a new cause of
action rather than to reject the Price Waterhouse Court’s
interpretation of how pre-existing actions are to be
treated.101

99. The applicability of § 107 to other proscriptions of discrimination in Title
VII is less clear. Neither the specific and unqualified prohibition of score
adjustments on “employment related tests” in § 703(l), as added by the 1991 Act,
nor the specific prohibition of discriminatory job notices or advertisement in
§ 704(b) requires a causation standard. The “motivating factor” standard seems
to fit the directive in § 717 that most federal government-affiliated employers
shall take personnel actions “free from any discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin,” but § 107(b)’s “same decision” defense for
remedies only modifies § 706(g) and thus is not directly applicable to the
delegation of remedial discretion to the EEOC in § 717(b).
100. See infra notes 101, 105.
101. The Committee Reports instead make clear that § 107 was passed to
restore what Congress in 1991 viewed as the intent of Congress in 1964 in
passing § 703(a). Thus, the Judiciary Committee Report on the 1991 Act stated:
When enacting the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Congress made clear that
it intended to prohibit all invidious consideration of sex, race, color,
religion, or national origin in employment decisions. However, the
Court’s decision in Price Waterhouse undercut this prohibition,
threatening to undermine Title VII’s twin objectives of deterring
employers from discriminatory conduct and redressing the injuries
suffered by victims of discrimination.
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The language of § 107 also makes clear that the
“motivating factor” causation standard it adopts is
applicable to all cases under any of Title VII’s pre-existing
proscriptions of intentional discrimination. The only
limiting or qualifying phrase in § 107(a) is the introductory
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this title,” which can be
read to refer to qualifications on liability such as the BFOQ
defense in § 703(e),102 or the bona fide seniority system
defense in § 703(h).103 The provision also ends by stating
that the “motivating factor” standard applies “even though
other factors also motivated the practice.”104 This phrase
attempts to insure the reach of the causation standard to
more difficult cases like Price Waterhouse itself where an
employer successfully demonstrates the existence of other
motivating factors; it cannot be reasonably read to limit the
reach to cases where such a demonstration is made. The
phrase is written as a phrase of emphasis, not a phrase of
exclusion. Furthermore, as causation standards help define
the underlying wrong that is to be condemned, there is no
good reason for any legislator to want a different underlying
causation standard in some cases than in others, however
the legislator thinks the burden of proof on causation should
be allocated. Not surprisingly, the legislative history of §
107 reveals no intent to limit the reach of
§ 107’s “motivating factor” causation standard to cases
where evidence establishes that some other factor “also
motivated the practice.”

H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 17 (1991). Similarly, the Report of the Committee
on Education and Labor on the Civil Rights Act of 1990, which was vetoed by
President George H. Bush, but eventually passed as the 1991 Act, stated:
“Legislation is needed to restore Title VII’s comprehensive ban on all
impermissible consideration of race, color, religion, sex or national origin in
employment.” H.R. REP. NO. 101-644, pt. 1, at 31 (1990) (emphasis added). It
would have been absurd for Congress to have overturned Price Waterhouse by
adding a new cause of action, rather than by clarifying the meaning of the old
cause of action. If § 703(m) provided a cause of action separate from that of
§ 703(a)(1), rather than a causation standard governing the original § 703(a)(1),
then Price Waterhouse would stand as a governing precedent for § 703(a)(1)
actions.
102. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (2006).
103. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
104. Id.
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The legislative history instead confirms that Congress
passed § 107 to clarify that employers, as well as the
entities covered by the other § 703 provisions, commit an
actionable wrong by taking into account one of the forbidden
status categories during any employment decision,
regardless of whether that decision would have been the
same in the absence of the discriminatory motivation.105
Congress provided defendants in § 107(b) a “same decision”
defense in recognition that those subjected to such wrongs
do not deserve compensation if they would have been
treated the same in the absence of the impermissible
motivating factor. In the view of the 1991 Act, however, a
discriminatory motivating factor is still “impermissible”106
and wrong, and still should be publicly condemned as such.
As Justice O’Connor acknowledged in her Price Waterhouse
concurrence, it still may stigmatize.107 It needs to be
deterred, moreover, because in many future cases it may
make a difference to its victims.
Notwithstanding § 107(b)’s limitation on remedies in
cases where defendants can prove that their challenged
decisions would have been the same in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor, the 1991 Act promised to
make the Title VII private cause of action a much more
effective
tool
to
deter
intentional
employment
105. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 18 (1991) (“In providing liability for
discrimination that is a ‘contributing factor,’ the Committee intends to restore
the rule applied by the majority of circuits prior to the Price Waterhouse decision
that any discrimination that is actually shown to play a role in a contested
employment decision may be the subject of liability.” (emphasis added)); see also
id. (“[T]he complaining party must demonstrate that discrimination was a
contributing factor in the employment decision—i.e., that discrimination
actually contributed to the employer’s decision with respect to the complaining
party.”); H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 48 (1991) (explaining that the standard
is whether the protected status category “actually contributed or was otherwise
a factor in an employment decision.”). The legislative history does not reflect
any intent that the “motivating factor” language indicate anything other than
contributing cause. Indeed, the Act used the language of “contributing factor”
before a late amendment substituted the “motivating factor” phrase. As
explained by the final House report accompanying the enacted bill: “This change
is cosmetic and will not materially change the courts’ findings.” 137 CONG. REC.
13537-38 (1991).
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2006).
107. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 265 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in judgment).
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discrimination. This was true both because of the Act’s
adoption of the motivating factor standard and because of
the Act’s guarantee of a jury trial in all cases alleging
intentional discrimination with the prospect of legal
damages.108 Adoption of the motivating factor standard
offered promise because most individuals have imperfect
records as employees; the records of most offer ample
reasons to be treated adversely by employers or potential
employers. In most cases, therefore, employers can offer
legitimate explanations for adverse treatment that cannot
be proven to be completely implausible or even insufficient.
As Justice O’Connor explained in her Price Waterhouse
opinion, lower court decisions before Price Waterhouse had
demonstrated the great difficulty plaintiffs with imperfect
work records or resumes have untangling plausible
legitimate motivations from illegitimate discriminatory
biases, even when the plaintiffs have adequate evidence to
demonstrate that the biases were brought to bear in an
adverse decision.109 By confirming that plaintiffs could
establish liability by proving that discriminatory bias was a
contributing “motivating factor,” the 1991 Act made more
realistic actions against the existence of such bias in the
workplace.110 More employees presumably could find
lawyers willing to bring more cases with less clear evidence
of how the employees would have been treated but for
discriminatory bias. Employers who could not be confident
that they could prove the absence of but-for causation would
have to calculate that it might be better to settle and pay
something for the existence of bias in their work place.
Plaintiffs’ lawyers presumably could realistically threaten
to proceed with litigation where they could prove the
existence of bias in the employer’s decision-making process,
as all parties would realize that lawyers could collect
attorneys’ fees based on proof of bias even if the employer
could prove that the bias would have made no difference to
the lawyers’ imperfect clients.111
108. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c) (2006).
109. See 490 U.S. at 273-74 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).
110. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
111. Section 107(b) expressly authorizes the grant of “attorney’s fees,”
regardless of a defendant’s proof that it would “have taken the same action.” 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(B). Nonetheless, many lower courts have denied the
incentive of attorney’s fees to eliminate the conduct Congress proscribed
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The fortification of the intentional discrimination cause
of action promised by the 1991 Act was enhanced further by
the Act’s guarantee of a right to have a jury determine
whether a discriminatory motive existed.112 The prospect of
a jury makes the threat of a trial more meaningful to an
employer in cases where plaintiffs have sufficient evidence
of discriminatory motivation to withstand a motion for
summary judgment or for a directed verdict.113 Jury trials
are both more expensive and more unpredictable. The latter
through § 107. See, e.g., Canup v. Chipman-Union, Inc., 123 F.3d 1440, 1442
(11th Cir. 1997) (denying fees even though plaintiff proved consideration of race
was a factor in his termination); Sheppard v. Riverview Nursing Ctr., Inc., 88
F.3d 1332, 1339 (4th Cir. 1996) (remanding to district court with discretion to
grant or deny fees even though plaintiff proved sexual harassment). The court in
Sheppard, the most cited decision on the issue, relied on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992), which had held that since
attorney’s fees awards under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 should be proportionate to
plaintiff’s success, a plaintiff who recovered only nominal damages of a dollar
should be awarded no fees. Sheppard, 88 F.3d at 1339; Farrar, 506 U.S. at 11415. The Sheppard court, ignoring the fact that Congress had set a standard of
public purpose through the compromise expressed in § 107, stated that in some
cases fees would be appropriate based on several factors, including “the public
purposes served” by the litigation. 88 F.3d at 1336. Some courts have awarded
fees citing Sheppard. See, e.g., Forrest v. Stinson Seafood Co., 990 F. Supp. 41,
45 (D. Me. 1998) (“[The] lawsuit was the primary force behind [the employer’s]
decision to revise its arbitrary and discriminatory policies.”). For a different
approach more consonant with the congressional policy balance expressed in
§ 107, see Gudenkauf v. Stauffer Communications, Inc., 158 F.3d 1074, 1080
(10th Cir. 1998), which noted that “Congress conclu[ded] that a plaintiff serves .
. . a public purpose when she proves impermissible discrimination was a factor
in her termination.”.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(c).
113. As later explained by the Court in the important Title VII case, Reeves v.
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 149-50 (2000) (quoting FED.
R. CIV. P. 50(a)), the standard for judgment as a matter of lawthat there be
“no legally sufficient evidentiary basis for a reasonable jury to find” for the
nonmoving partyapplies as well to motions for summary judgment. The
Reeves court, citing Lytle v. Household Mfg., Inc., 494 U.S. 545, 554-55 (1990),
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 254 (1986) and Continental Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 696 n.6 (1962), further
explained that for both motions, “the court must draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may not make credibility determinations
or weigh the evidence.” Reeves, 530 U.S. at 150. The existence vel non of a
particular motivation is of course a question of fact, often turning on the
assessment of the credibility of witnesses who claim to have heard or rather
deny expressions of bias. Id.
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may be particularly true for cases brought by plaintiffemployees with whom jurors can sympathize—perhaps
more easily than can the successful lawyers who become
judges. The unpredictability could be compounded by § 107
allowing jurors to accept both the plaintiff’s proof of the
existence of a discriminatory motive and the defendant’s
proof that it was not a necessary cause of the adverse
action.114 The prospect of such a compromise could both
encourage plaintiffs’ attorneys and change employers’
calculations of the value of settlements.
Furthermore, the 1991 Act’s clarification of Title VII’s
causation standard, in tandem with the Court’s clarification
in Aikens of the function of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
framework,115 enabled trial courts to provide juries with
direct and easy-to-comprehend instructions that could avoid
the confusion of meritorious cases. Under § 107, juries only
need to be instructed that to establish liability a plaintiff
must prove that one of the forbidden status categories was a
“motivating factor” in the challenged adverse employment
action, and that to avoid certain remedies a defendant must
prove that it “would have taken the same action in the
absence of” this “impermissible motivating factor.”116 Given
§ 107’s rejection of the Court’s Price Waterhouse decision,
the trial courts did not have to be concerned with fashioning
complicated formulations to reconcile the latter decision
with the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine proof framework.
Indeed, the Court’s pre-1991 Act decision in Aikens
indicated that at least in the absence of a request by
plaintiff for an instruction explaining the value of pretext
evidence,117 the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework
114. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2).
115. See supra text accompanying notes 41-45.
116. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
117. After U.S. Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716
(1983), but before the Court’s decision in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509
U.S. 502 (1993), it was still possible for plaintiffs to argue reasonably that they
should be able to obtain an instruction directing jurors to find the existence of
discriminatory motivation if the jurors found that the defendant’s proffered
legitimate motive was pretextual. Even after Hicks,, 509 U.S. at 511, in light of
Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. at 133, 146-48 (2000),
plaintiffs may still argue that they should be able to obtain an instruction
explaining that a finding of pretext may be considered relevant to the question
of a discriminatory motive. Such an instruction does not, however, require any
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need not be mentioned in jury instructions at all. The
Aikens Court held, it will be recalled, that once the
employer escapes the force of a mandatory presumption of
discrimination by articulating a legitimate explanation for
taking the adverse action against the employee-plaintiff, it
is irrelevant whether the plaintiff has proven all the
elements of a prima facie case sufficient to impel the
employer to offer such a legitimate motivation.118 Thus,
since the only issue before the fact finder after a Title VII
trial in which discriminatory intent is alleged is the issue of
discriminatory motivation, a jury only needs to be
instructed to consider all the evidence of the parties to
determine whether there was such motivation, which, after
the 1991 Act, means whether discriminatory bias was a
factor in the challenged decision.
Congressional supporters of the 1991 Act thus could
have thought that they had strengthened considerably the
deterrent force of Title VII against the existence of
forbidden discriminatory bias in employment decision
making. They had done so by clearing a direct path for
plaintiffs through the confusing tangle of the various
opinions in Price Waterhouse, by pronouncing that plaintiffs
need only prove contributing, rather than necessary,
causation and by requiring employers and other potential
Title VII respondents to defend their decision making to the
peers of their employees acting as judges of the credibility
and plausibility of evidence.
As explained below, however, the lower federal courts
have compromised the 1991 Act’s potential strengthening of
Title VII by limiting the relevance of § 107 for many
explanation of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine prima facie case or its burden-ofproduction shifting framework. See Reeves, 530 U.S. at 153-54. Pretext
instructions have been required in some, but not all, circuits. Compare
Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232, 1241 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding that in appropriate cases jurors must be instructed that they can infer
discriminatory motive from their disbelief of employer’s proffered explanation),
and Ratliff v. City of Gainesville, 256 F.3d 355, 360-61 (5th Cir. 2001) (same),
with Conroy v. Abraham Chevrolet-Tampa, Inc., 375 F.3d 1228, 1233-34 (11th
Cir. 2004) (holding it is not reversible error to deny requested pretext jury
instructions, if instructions accurately stated the law and did not preclude the
jury from using pretext evidence to find discrimination), and Moore v. Robertson
Fire Prot. Dist., 249 F.3d 786, 789-90 (8th Cir. 2001) (same).
118. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715; see also supra text accompanying note 44.
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disparate treatment cases.119 Not surprisingly, these same
courts also did not interpret Price Waterhouse and the
Congressional response in a manner that facilitated the
proof of disparate treatment cases under the ADEA.
II. A “BUT-FOR” STANDARD FOR THE ADEA
A. Before Gross v. FBL Financial Services
The lower courts, with few exceptions, made two basic
interpretive choices for ADEA disparate treatment cases in
the wake of Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act. First, they
held that the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting causation
system rather than the alternative burden-shifting system
embraced by Congress in § 107 should apply to the ADEA.120
Second, they held that the application of the Price
Waterhouse system should be conditioned on the threshold
proof standards set forth in Justice O’Connor’s concurring
opinion in Price Waterhouse.121
The first choice was reasonable. The wording of the
prohibition of intentional discrimination in the ADEA is
identical to the wording of the prohibition of disparate
treatment discrimination in Title VII, with the substitution
of “age” in the ADEA for the categories of “race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin” in Title VII.122 Section 107,
however, amended only Title VII, not the ADEA or any
119. See infra text accompanying notes 167-203 and 223-50.
120. See, e.g., Febres v. Challenger Caribbean Corp., 214 F.3d 57, 62 (1st Cir.
2000); Lewis v. YMCA, 208 F.3d 1303, 1304-05 (1st Cir. 2000) (per curiam);
Hutson v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 63 F.3d 771, 780 (8th Cir. 1995); Starceski
v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 54 F.3d 1089, 1096 (3d Cir. 1995); Ostrowski v. Atl.
Mut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 180 (2d Cir. 1992); Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assocs.,
Inc., 924 F.2d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1991).
121. See infra notes 129-34 and cases cited therein.
122. See Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202,
§ 4(a)(1), 81 Stat. 602, 603 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1) (2006)); Civil Rights
Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 703(a)(1), 78 Stat. 241, 255 (codified at 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006)). Each states that it shall be an unlawful “for an
employer to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s,” in the
case of § 703(a)(1) of Title VII, “race, color, religion, sex, or national origin,” or in
the case of § 4(a)(1) of the ADEA, “age.”
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other federal law. Furthermore, Congress did not through
the 1991 Act, or any other legislation, otherwise amend the
ADEA in response to Price Waterhouse. It was reasonable
for the lower courts to interpret Price Waterhouse as the
Court’s default system for proof of causation under at least
similar vaguely written federal employment discrimination
statutes and § 107 as a rejection of this default standard for
only Title VII. Congressional silence on other statutes like
the ADEA could be interpreted with a pregnant negative—
acceptance of the default rule.
This interpretation was not inevitable.123 Since Price
Waterhouse was itself a Title VII case involving sex
discrimination, the courts also could have reasonably
interpreted the Congressional rejection of the Price
Waterhouse system for Title VII, without any negative
pregnant for other statues, simply as a rejection of this
system for the only statute on which Congress was then
focusing its attention.124 The lower courts then could have
adopted § 107’s burden-shifting as an alternative default
system that more likely expressed Congressional preference
for federal employment law.125 Nonetheless, the general
allegiance in the lower courts to the default standard of a
123. See Martin J. Katz, Unifying Disparate Treatment (Really), 59 HASTINGS
L.J. 643, 661-72 (2008) (arguing that courts should have unified employment
discrimination law on disparate treatment based on the 1991 Act).
124. If Congress had amended the prohibition of age discrimination in the
ADEA in the 1991 Act, the negative pregnant argument would have had much
greater force. See Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 330 (1997) (“[N]egative
implications raised by disparate provisions are strongest when the [relevant
statutory provisions] were being considered simultaneously when the language
raising the implication was inserted.”). The only provision in the 1991 Act that
mentions the ADEA, § 115, amending 29 U.S.C. § 626(e), addressed a conflicting
statute of limitations problem in ADEA litigation by discarding the use of the
Fair Labor Standards Act limitations system in favor of one more akin to that of
Title VII; nothing in the 1991 Act addressed the substantive prohibitions of the
ADEA.
125. As noted by Justice Stevens in his dissenting opinion in Gross v. FBL
Financial Services, Inc., there is evidence of such intent in the U.S. House of
Representatives’ Report on the 1991 Act, which states that a “number of other
laws banning discrimination, including . . . the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA) . . . are modeled after and have been interpreted in a
manner consistent with Title VII,” and “these other laws modeled after Title VII
[should] be interpreted in a manner consistent with Title VII as amended by
this Act . . . .” 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2356 n.6 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
H.R. REP. NO. 102-40 (II), at 4 (1991)).
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Supreme Court-formulated Price Waterhouse rather than to
the legislatively formulated § 107 was not surprising.
Much more surprising, and much less reasonable, was
the lower courts’ embrace of Justice O’Connor’s concurring
opinion in Price Waterhouse as controlling in ADEA cases.
This embrace was almost unanimous,126 until the Supreme
Court’s rejection in Desert Palace v. Costa of Justice
O’Connor’s direct evidence distinction for Title VII cases
governed by § 107 of the 1991 Act. As explained above,
Justice O’Connor’s Price Waterhouse opinion provided a
sixth vote in favor of a burden-shifting system only for cases
in which plaintiffs offered adequate “direct evidence” of the
existence of intentional discrimination.127 The opinion thus
limited the reach of burden-shifting under Price Waterhouse
in a significant way that Justice White’s fifth vote
concurring opinion did not. The lower courts nonetheless
adopted Justice O’Connor’s standard of requiring plaintiffs
to present “direct evidence” of an age-based motivation as a
condition for requiring defendants to prove the absence of
but-for causation.128 Plaintiffs who could not marshal such
evidence were forced to prove pretext under the old
126. But see infra note 204 and accompanying text.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 79, 92-93.
128. Some of the courts that read Justice O’Connor’s opinion as controlling did
so based on the Court’s statement in Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193
(1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 169 n.15 (1976)), that “[w]hen a
fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result
enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed as
that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.’” This statement, however, was made by the Court in both
Marks and Gregg to determine whose view among five Justices in the majority
should be controlling, not to determine which five Justices constituted the
majority. See Marks, 430 U.S. at 193-94; Greggs, 428 U.S. at 169. To determine
which five Justices constituted the majority, a court should look for the greatest
agreement among five Justices. Otherwise, where two groups of four Justices
are in slight disagreement, a single Justice could control the holding in a case by
formulating a narrow concurring opinion that varies greatly from each of the
other two opinions. Thus, in Price Waterhouse, Justice White’s opinion should be
treated as supplying the fifth vote because it was much closer to that of Justice
Brennan’s four-Justice plurality and Justice White’s opinion should be
controlling because it provided what might be termed in minor respects a more
“narrow” basis for the decision. See supra text accompanying notes 89-91. Cf.
Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs. Inc., 129 S. Ct. 2343, 2357 (2009) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that Justice White’s opinion provided a fifth vote on burdenshifting, so the Marks-test was not relevant).
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McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework. These plaintiffs
thus retained the burden of proving age discrimination as a
necessary cause by proof of the insufficiency of the
employers’ proffered justifications.129
While the lower courts—at least before Desert Palace—
were almost united in finding law in Justice O’Connor’s
Price Waterhouse opinion, they were not united in their
discernment of the meaning of that law. Some courts in
ADEA cases professed to read Justice O’Connor’s direct
evidence language as a reference to the distinction in
evidence law between direct and circumstantial evidence.130
These courts considered relevant to a Price Waterhouse
burden-shifting case only what the courts loosely described
as evidence that is probative without the need of any logical
inference of the existence of discriminatory motivation.
Other courts read Justice O’Connor’s language to refer to
the distinction made in Burdine between evidence that
directly proves the existence of a discriminatory motive and
evidence that only can do so indirectly by proving the
absence or at least insufficiency of other motives.131 Most of
these latter courts, however, parsing Justice O’Connor’s
language more closely, indicated that they would consider
only a subset of such Burdine-type direct evidence as within
the set of qualifying evidence. Typically this subset included
only evidence of statements by a decision maker that
reflected some evidence of animus toward the plaintiff’s
advanced age and also were closely connected to the
129. See, e.g., Hill v. Lockheed Martin Logistics Mgmt., 314 F.3d 657, 663-64
(4th Cir. 2003), rev’d on other grounds, 354 F.3d 277 (4th Cir. 2004); Vesprini v.
Shaw Contract Flooring Servs., 315 F.3d 37, 41 (1st Cir. 2002); Wright v.
Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1305-06 (11th Cir. 1999); Lightfoot v. Union
Carbide Corp., 110 F.3d 898, 913 (2d Cir. 1997); Armbruster v. Unisys Corp., 32
F.3d 768, 777 (3d Cir. 1994), abrogated by Showalter v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med.
Ctr., 190 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1999); Beshears v. Asbill, 930 F.2d 1348, 1353 (8th
Cir. 1991); Summers v. Comm. Channels, Inc., 729 F. Supp. 1234, 1237-38 (N.D.
Ill. 1990).
130. See, e.g., Vesprini, 315 F.3d at 40-43; Nichols v. Loral Vought Sys. Corp.,
81 F.3d 38, 40 (5th Cir. 1996) (“‘Direct evidence of discrimination is evidence
which, if believed, would prove the existence of a fact (i.e., unlawful
discrimination) without any inferences or presumptions.’” (quoting Bodenheimer
v. PPG Indus., Inc., 5 F.3d 955, 958 (5th Cir. 1993))).
131. See, e.g., Hill, 314 F.3d at 664-65; Wright, 187 F.3d at 1293, 1303 n.18;
Lightfoot, 110 F.3d at 913; Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 778.
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challenged adverse decision.132 The standards for close
connection to a challenged decision, whether measured in
time or in job relatedness, varied.133
Although the more restrictive interpretations of Justice
O’Connor’s “direct evidence” language hampered plaintiffs
more, all the interpretations made proof of age
discrimination more difficult because they refused to allow
Price Waterhouse burden-shifting on the causation issue in
cases where the standard could make more of a difference—
cases in which plaintiffs did not have unusually strong
evidence of discrimination. These cases included ones in
which plaintiffs could not connect evidence of
discriminatory animus around the workplace with a
challenged adverse decision as well as ones in which
plaintiffs had little evidence of discriminatory evidence to
add to evidence questioning the credibility of an employer’s
justifications for the adverse decision. The lower courts’ use
of the “direct evidence” limitation thus forced plaintiffs in
most cases to prove necessary, rather than only
contributing, causation through proof of the insufficiency of
the legitimate motivations offered by defendants.

132. See Wright, 187 F.3d at 1303-04 (holding that evidence that the
individuals responsible for plaintiff’s termination made comments about
plaintiff’s age in connection with his performance three months before the
termination was “direct” evidence); Armbruster, 32 F.3d at 778.
133. See, e.g., Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, 317 F.3d 564, 572 (6th Cir.
2003) (finding direct evidence in remarks allegedly made by decisionmakers
near the time of the adverse action); Morris v. N.Y. City Dep’t of Sanitation, No.
99-CV-4376(WK), 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5146, at *21 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2003)
(finding that evidence of age-related comments allegedly made by “by an
individual with substantial influence over [plaintiff’s] employment” near the
time of plaintiff’s constructive discharge and during a discussion of plaintiff’s
future with defendant-employer was “direct” evidence); Engstrand v. Pioneer
Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 946 F. Supp. 1390, 1399 (S.D. Iowa 1996) (“[W]hen assessing
the ultimate issue of intentional discrimination, the court may properly
disregard any stray remarks made by the decisionmaker but not causally
related to the decisionmaking process.”) (suggesting the same holds true even if
the comments were made near the time of the adverse decision), aff’d, 112 F.3d
513 (8th Cir. 1997); Summers, 729 F. Supp. at 1239 (noting lack of jobrelatedness as one reason plaintiff’s evidence was not “direct”).
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B. Gross v. FBL Financial Services
The lower federal courts continued to consistently apply
the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting system on the
causation issue in ADEA cases until the Supreme Court’s
decision in Gross.134 After the Court’s 2003 decision in Desert
Palace to reject Justice O’Connor’s distinction of direct
evidence for Title VII litigation, however, some, though not
all, federal courts of appeals opinions held that the direct
evidence distinction also should not apply in ADEA
litigation.135 It was thus not surprising that the Court finally
decided to address the causation issue in an ADEA case by
granting certiorari to review the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals’ decision in Gross to continue to require direct
evidence as a condition of Price Waterhouse burdenshifting.136
The Supreme Court in Gross could have reasonably set
aside its Price Waterhouse decision to adopt the § 107
causation standard and proof system as default rules for
other federal anti-discrimination in employment commands.
The case for the Court doing so at the apex of the federal
judiciary was stronger than the case for the lower courts
doing so. The Court had itself formulated Price Waterhouse
from ambiguous language; reversing this formulation to
accord with Congress’ response of a much clearer legislative
pronouncement would have been within the interpretive
authority of the Court and could be defended easily as an
expression of inter-branch cooperation in lawmaking. The
best time for the Court to respond to Congress by replacing
the Price Waterhouse system with that of § 107 would have
134. See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack In The Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305 (5th Cir. 2004);
EEOC v. Warfield-Rohr Casket Co., 364 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 2004); Wexler, 317
F.3d 564.
135. Compare, e.g., Rachid, 376 F.3d at 310-11 (finding Desert Palace to
warrant rejection of direct evidence requirement for ADEA litigation), and
Estades-Negroni v. Assocs. Corp. of N. Am., 345 F.3d 25, 30 (1st Cir. 2003)
(same), with Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 526 F.3d 356, 361 (8th Cir. 2008)
(continuing to apply direct-evidence standard to claims brought under the
ADEA), vacated, 129 S. Ct. 2343 (2009), and Glanzman v. Metro. Mgmt. Corp.,
391 F.3d 506, 512 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (same), and Warfield-Rohr, 364 F.3d at 163
n.1, 164 n.2 (applying Price Waterhouse and assuming that the direct-evidence
standard applies to ADEA cases).
136. 526 F.3d 356 (8th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 77 U.S.L.W. 3340 (U.S. Dec. 5,
2008) (No. 08-441).
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been during the first years after the passage of the 1991
Act. The Court’s long acceptance of the lower courts’
consistent embrace of Price Waterhouse must have created
some expectation in Congress that Price Waterhouse
burden-shifting would govern the causation issue in federal
employment statutes in the absence of express instructions
to the contrary in new legislation.
Furthermore, the adoption of § 107 by the Supreme
Court as a default standard for the ADEA seemed even less
likely in the wake of the Court’s decision in Smith v. City of
Jackson.137 In Smith, the Court held that the codification of
the disparate impact cause of action through § 105 of the
1991 Act did not affect disparate impact litigation under the
ADEA because the 1991 Act did not expressly amend the
ADEA with respect to disparate impact.138 The Court in
Smith139 stated that Congress’ failure to amend the ADEA
meant that disparate impact actions under that statute
should be governed by the last relevant Title VII disparate
impact precedent, Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.140
Applying the same logic, the Court would have had to read
Congress’ failure to amend the ADEA with respect to
causation in disparate treatment cases to mean that the
ADEA causation issue should be governed by the last
relevant Title VII precedent, Price Waterhouse, which
incidentally was decided the same term as Wards Cove.
Given its decision in Smith, it thus seemed likely that
the Court would not cast the Price Waterhouse precedent
totally aside in favor of the § 107 model, but would instead
resolve, in light of its Desert Palace decision, the issue on
which it granted certiorari: “whether a plaintiff must
present direct evidence of age discrimination in order to
obtain a mixed-motives jury instruction in a suit brought
under the [ADEA].”141 The Court in Gross, however, without
giving the Justice Department as representative of the
Equal
Employment
Opportunity
Commission
an
137. 544 U.S. 228 (2005).
138. Id. at 240.
139. Id.
140. 490 U.S. 642 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub.
L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006)).
141. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2346.
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opportunity to brief the issue,142 rendered moot questions
about the relevance and meaning of Justice O’Connor’s
direct evidence standard. The Court, in a 5-4 decision
penned by Justice Thomas, did so by rejecting for ADEA
litigation the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting system as
well as the system suggested by Congress in § 107 of the
1991 Act.143 The Court held that a plaintiff in an ADEA
disparate treatment case must prove that consideration of
age was a “but-for” or necessary causation of the defendant’s
challenged adverse employment decision144—the position
taken by Justice Kennedy for only three Justices twenty
years before in Price Waterhouse. The four dissenting
Justices in Gross would have held Price Waterhouse burdenshifting applicable in ADEA cases without use of any direct
evidence standard.145
Justice Thomas’s majority opinion gives no convincing
reason for rejecting the holding of Price Waterhouse as
precedent for interpreting the ADEA and for instead
favoring Justice Kennedy’s dissenting interpretation of
identical controlling language in Title VII.146 Justice Thomas
stressed that Congress did not amend the ADEA as it
amended Title VII through § 107 of the 1991 Act and thus
that “the ADEA’s text does not provide that a plaintiff may
establish discrimination by showing that age was simply a
motivating factor.”147 This, however, is not an argument
against the relevance of Price Waterhouse, the Court’s
controlling precedent before the 1991 Act, but rather an
argument to support its relevance. On the one hand, if the
passage of § 107 communicated anything from Congress
concerning a causation standard for laws other than Title
VII, it was that the § 107 system rather than the Title VII
system should provide the default standard. On the other
hand, if Congress’ failure to amend the text of other laws
like the ADEA when it amended the text of Title VII
communicated anything, it was that Congress was satisfied
with the Price Waterhouse system for these other laws.
142. Id. at 2353 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 2346, 2348-49 (majority opinion).
144. Id. at 2352.
145. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357-58 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
146. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
147. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2349.
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There is no reasonable way to read the legislative history of
the 1991 Act, as did Justice Thomas, to empower the Court
to ignore both the Price Waterhouse precedent and the
legislatively formulated § 107 system. Justice Thomas’s
twisting of the relevance of § 107 seems all the more
egregious because he used Congress’ effort to make proof of
causation easier under Title VII as an excuse to move in the
opposite direction from Price Waterhouse to make the proof
of age discrimination more difficult.148
Justice Thomas also allowed “it is far from clear that
the Court would have the same approach” for Title VII
“were it to consider the question today in the first
instance.”149 This candid admission that a current majority
of the Court would not have adopted the Price Waterhouse
approach “in the first instance” is not a reason to reject it as
a statutory precedent, however. The rejection of a statutory
precedent, which of course can be overturned at any time by
Congress, requires some justification beyond a change in
the membership of the Court. The only further justification
offered by Justice Thomas was that the “burden-shifting
framework is difficult to apply.”150 Yet Justice Thomas did
not explain this assertion and it is hard to understand why
a simple jury instruction assigning a burden of persuasion
to plaintiffs on contributing causation and to employers on
but-for causation poses any difficulties.151 Justice Thomas
cited to two lower court opinions from the early 1990s,152
148. Justice Thomas, in an illogical footnote purporting to distinguish the
Court’s indistinguishable reliance on Wards Cove in Smith v. City of Jackson,
asserted that “Congress’ careful tailoring of the ‘motivating factor’ claim in Title
VII . . . confirms that we cannot transfer the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting
framework into the ADEA.” Id. at 2352 n.5. Justice Thomas contended that if
“motivating factor” was already the causation standard for Title VII claims,
Congress would not have added § 703(m) to Title VII through the 1991 Act. Id.
This contention, however, has relevance only to the argument that § 703(m)
should not be applied to the ADEA; it has no relevance to the applicability of
Price Waterhouse burden-shifting to ADEA liability. The applicability of the
latter assumes that § 703(m)’s absolute “motivating factor” causation standard
without burden-shifting on liability is not the law. Id.
149. Id. at 2346.
150. Id. at 2352.
151. See supra text accompanying notes 115-18.
152. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352 (citing Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d
1176 (2d Cir. 1992); Visser v. Packer Eng’g Assocs., Inc., 924 F.2d 655 (7th Cir.
1991) (en banc)).
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only one of which, a dissent, seems generally to agree.153 The
other opinion’s reference to “murky waters”154 is directed
primarily at the real difficulty the lower courts had in
applying Price Waterhouse—agreeing on a consistent
interpretation of the meaning of a direct evidence
standard.155 The rejection of that standard for ADEA cases
governed by Price Waterhouse burden-shifting thus would
have resolved any difficulty of application as surely as did
the Desert Palace decision for Title VII cases governed by
§ 107 burden-shifting.
Justice Thomas’s use of a “difficulty-of-application”
excuse to reject the burden-shifting aspect of the Price
Waterhouse precedent is indeed especially troublesome
because Congress elected to adopt this aspect of Price
Waterhouse in § 107.156 Section 107, it will be recalled, uses
the same kind of burden-shifting to allow employers to
avoid specific significant remedies in Title VII disparate
treatment cases by demonstrating the absence of but-for
causation.157 Even if there were evidence that burdenshifting was difficult to apply, that evidence would be better
weighed as part of a policy judgment made by Congress,
rather than by the Court against a contrary legislative
judgment.158
Even if there were merit to Justice Thomas’s curious
contention that the passage of the 1991 Act, rather than
confirming the use of burden-shifting on the causation issue
in employment law, instead somehow freed the Court from
the restraints of the Price Waterhouse burden-shifting
precedent, his opinion does not offer persuasive arguments
to posit a necessary causation standard for the ADEA. In a
single paragraph, Justice Thomas could only recycle the
arguments for a necessary causation standard that Justice
Kennedy had advanced in his Price Waterhouse dissenting
153. Visser, 924 F.2d at 661 (Flaum, J., dissenting).
154. Tyler, 958 F.2d at 1179.
155. Id. at 1183-86.
156. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2352; id. at 2356-57 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
157. See supra text accompanying notes 95-98.
158. Moreover, as Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, the holding in Gross
will require complicating jury instructions and analysis in cases in which both
ADEA and Title VII claims are involved, with burden-shifting only relevant to
the latter. Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2357 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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opinion.159 Thus, relying on truncated definitions of “because
of” from three dictionaries, Justice Thomas asserted that
this critical phrase in the ADEA, as well as Title VII, must
mean “by reason” of or “on account of” as an “ordinary
meaning.” Justice Thomas’s opinion displays no awareness
that this translation does not offer an answer, but rather
continues to beg the question of what level of causation is
denoted by “reason of” or “on account of.” As suggested
above with respect to Justice Kennedy’s translation to
“make a difference,” in ordinary speech we certainly treat
sufficient causes as reasons as well as causes, regardless of
whether the causes are necessary.160 Indeed, in ordinary
speech we often treat multiple contributing reasons as
causes even when none are necessary or sufficient. For
instance, we would state that each failing score on one of
five tests was a reason for or cause of a failing grade for a
semester even though no single low individual test score
was either necessary or sufficient for the semester grade.161
Because Justice Thomas wrote comforted by the illusion
that the critical phrase “because of” can denote only
necessary causation, he was able to avoid determining the
most sensible construction of the phrase through any
159. Id. at 2350 (majority opinion).
160. See supra text accompanying notes 55-57.
161. Justice Thomas also quoted dicta in an earlier ADEA decision of the
Court, Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604 (1993), asserting that an
employment discrimination claim “cannot succeed unless the employee’s
protected trait actually played a role . . . and had a determinative influence on
the outcome.” Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2350 (quoting Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at 610).
This post-Price Waterhouse and post-1991 Act dicta would seem to apply to Title
VII disparate treatment cases as well, however, and thus must be tempered
with recognition that even the word “determinative” can express contributing
causation. Moreover, Justice O’Connor’s dicta in Hazen Paper must be read in
the context of the opinion’s holding that a decision based on a status “correlated
with age, as pension status typically is,” is not motivated by age. Hazen Paper.
507 U.S. at 611. Furthermore, as Justice Stevens noted in his dissent, 129 S. Ct.
at 2355, Justice O’Connor’s opinion in Hazen Paper also suggested contributing
causation as the standard for ADEA liability. Justice O’Connor stated: (1) that
the ADEA “requires the employer to ignore an employee’s age,” (2) that “[w]hen
the employer’s decision is wholly motivated by factors other than age,” there is
no violation of the ADEA; and (3) that there might be “dual liability under
ERISA and the ADEA where the decision to fire the employee was motivated
both by the employee’s age and by his pension status.” Hazen Paper, 507 U.S. at
611-13 (emphasis added). Nor has the Court definitively provided any causation
standard for the ADEA in any other decision.
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analysis of the purposes and operation of the employment
discrimination laws in general or of the ADEA in particular.
Like Justice O’Connor in her concurring opinion in Price
Waterhouse, Justice Breyer offered such analysis in his
dissenting opinion in Gross.162 Justice Breyer stressed that
separating multiple entangled motivations for decisions,
unlike determining the cause of physical events, is usually
“a hypothetical inquiry about what would have happened if
the employer’s thoughts and other circumstances had been
different.”163 Justice Breyer suggested that because such
inquiries may be particularly difficult for employees without
access to decision makers thought processes, it is a sensible
translation of employment discrimination commands to ask
the employee to prove only contributing causation, even if
the employer can avoid liability by demonstrating the
absence of necessary causation.164 Rather than engaging the
coherence and accuracy of Justice Breyer’s position, in a
footnote response, Justice Thomas merely asserted that the
Court “must give effect to Congress’ choice” to not amend
the ADEA when it amended Title VII through § 107.165
The assertion of judicial power in Gross is remarkable,
however, precisely because it is not reasonable, as explained
above, to view the “choice” of Congress to enact § 107 as a
choice to reject for the ADEA both Price Waterhouse and §
107 burden-shifting.166 The Court’s unconvincing rejection in
Gross of both its own precedent and of the lead of Congress
in § 107 thus is likely to prompt further Congressional
action. Before taking that action in the form of a simple
extension of the § 107 model to the ADEA in particular or to
employment statutes in general, however, Congress should
understand how the reach of § 107 has been limited by the
federal judiciary.

162. See Gross, 129 S. Ct. at 2358 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163. Id. at 2359.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 2350 n.3 (majority opinion).
166. See supra text accompanying notes 146-48.
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III. THE UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF § 107
A. Judicial Interpretation of § 107 Before Desert Palace
As suggested above, Congressional supporters of the
1991 Act and the original goals of Title VII could have
thought that by rejecting the causation standard of Price
Waterhouse in favor of the motivating factor standard of
§ 107, they had strengthened considerably the deterrent
force of the Title VII disparate treatment cause of action
against employment discrimination.167 The federal judiciary,
however, viewed quite differently the 1991 Act’s relevance
to the proof of intentional discrimination. Before the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals’ en banc decision reviewed in
Desert Palace,168 most panels of the various Circuit Courts of
Appeals treated the causation standard pronounced in §
107(a) as applicable to only a limited set of cases alleging
intentional discrimination, notwithstanding the unqualified
language of the provision and the absence of any legislative
history suggesting any intended qualification. These Court
of Appeals’ decisions,169 moreover, found the standard for
the limitation embedded in the same “direct evidence”
language in Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Price
Waterhouse that the courts used to apply Price Waterhouse
to ADEA cases. The courts’ embrace of Justice O’Connor’s
opinion for Title VII as well as ADEA cases was despite the
fact that Congress, at least for Title VII, had directly
rejected that opinion’s premise of a necessary causation
standard. The federal judiciary used some ambiguous words
in a non-controlling opinion of a single Justice to trump the
clear meaning of a subsequently enacted Congressional
directive.170
The lower courts had the same difficulty reaching
consensus on the meaning of Justice O’Connor’s “direct
167. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
168. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 847-48 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
169. See, e.g., Fernandes v. Costa Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st
Cir. 1999); Kubicko v. Ogden Logistics Servs., 181 F.3d 544, 552-53 (4th Cir.
1999); see also infra text accompanying notes 182-193 (discussing Fernandes,
199 F.3d 572); infra cases notes 171-72 and cases cited therein.
170. It may be impish, but not inaccurate, to characterize Justice O’Connor’s
ambiguous words on direct evidence as “stray remarks.”
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evidence” standard for Title VII litigation as they did for
ADEA litigation. For Title VII cases as well some courts
tried to tie the standard to a distinction of circumstantial
evidence,171 while others formulated some other definition
based on how closely the evidence was tied to the challenged
employment decision.172 Regardless of the standard used,
however, the effect on Title VII plaintiffs was the same as
the effect on ADEA plaintiffs: those who could not present
adequate “direct evidence” were forced to proceed under the
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework and demonstrate
discrimination as a necessary cause by proving the pretext
or insufficiency of the employers’ proffered justifications.
Consider, as an example of the pre-Desert Palace use of
the “direct evidence” dicta to preserve the McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine framework and a necessary causation
standard, Shorter v. ICG Holdings, Inc.173 Sheila Shorter,
the plaintiff in the case, alleged that her termination from a
corporate recruiter position with ICG was caused by the
racism of her supervisor, Judy Dughman, after Dughman
replaced the supervisor who hired Shorter. ICG claimed,
based on the testimony of numerous other employees, that
Shorter was fired for “inadequate job performance.”174 The
appellate court reviewed the trial court’s grant of summary
171. See, e.g., Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d 1541, 1546-47 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding
that plaintiff whose supervisor allegedly remarked, “Fucking women, I hate
having fucking women in the office,” offered merely circumstantial evidence of
discriminatory intent and therefore was not entitled to a mixed-motive
instruction); Sabree v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners Local No. 33, 921
F.2d 396, 404 (1st Cir. 1990) (labeling Price Waterhouse as a “direct” evidence
case and plaintiff’s case as a “circumstantial” evidence case to be governed by
McDonnell Douglas); Templet v. Hard Rock Constr. Co., No. 02-0929, 2003 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 1023, at *6-9 (E.D. La. Jan. 27, 2003).
172. See, e.g., Kerns v. Capital Graphics, Inc., 178 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir.
1999) (holding that plaintiff was not entitled to a mixed-motive instruction as
she failed to offer direct evidence, which could have included “discriminatory
references to the particular employee in a work context, or stated hostility to
women being in the workplace at all”); Kubicko, 181 F.3d at 552-54 (finding that
statements made by a decisionmaker two days before plaintiff’s termination
were “direct” evidence of retaliation in violation of Title VII); Shorter v. ICG
Holdings, Inc., 188 F.3d 1204, 1212 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Fye v.
Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 516 F.3d 1217 (10th Cir. 2008); see also infra text
accompanying notes 173-77.
173. 188 F.3d 1204 (10th Cir. 1999), overruled in part by Fye, 516 F.3d 1217.
174. Id. at 1208-09.
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judgment for ICG in the typical manner of the lower courts
after Price Waterhouse and the 1991 Act—by bifurcating
consideration of the adequacy of plaintiff’s “direct evidence”
of discriminatory causation, on the one hand, and of her
“indirect evidence” of such causation, on the other.175 The
latter evidence, the court explained must fit into the
“McDonnell Douglas framework,” which requires the
plaintiff to prove the employer’s proffered legitimate motive
is pretextual and thus that the discriminatory motive was a
necessary cause.176 Only adequate direct evidence, which the
court described as probative “without inference or
presumption,”177can warrant a finding of discrimination
without proof of pretext. Applying its strict definition of
direct evidence, the court found none of Shorter’s evidence
to be “direct,” even though this evidence included testimony
that Dughman had called Shorter an “incompetent nigger” a
day or two after Shorter’s termination, and that Dughman
had made several race-related comments to Shorter,
including criticizing her for talking like people of her
“culture, race, or color.”178 These comments, the court
asserts, are “statements of personal opinion,” rather than
“direct evidence that Dughman fired Shorter because she
was black. Instead, the trier of fact would have to infer
Dughman’s motive from her statements.”179
The court’s further analysis of the case under the
McDonnell Douglas framework indicates that its refusal to
apply a motivating factor causation standard based on this
application of the direct evidence language may have been
critical to upholding the trial court’s grant of summary
judgment against Shorter. Since Shorter, a typical employee
with far from a perfect record of achievement, had little
evidence to disprove the existence of some complaints
against her past performance, the court found that she did
not offer sufficient evidence to disprove the adequacy of
ICG’s
proffered
explanation
of
inadequate
job
performance.180 The court noted again the racist comments
175. Id. at 1207-10.
176. Id. at 1208.
177. Id. at 1207.
178. Id. at 1206, 1208.
179. Id. at 1208.
180. Id. at 1208-10.
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of the supervisor who fired her, but stated that without
“some nexus between the statements and the defendant’s
decision to terminate the employee,” a trier of fact could not
find pretext.181
The Shorter court applied an especially restrictive
definition of the protean “direct evidence” standard. A
similar, if less obvious, impact on plaintiffs’ ability to prove
causation occurred even in cases professing to apply a
broader definition, based not on excluding all circumstantial
evidence, but rather on favoring a particularly reliable type
of Burdine-type direct evidence of the existence of
discriminatory motivation. An example is provided by the
frequently cited decision in Fernandes v. Costa Brothers
Masonry, Inc.182 Fernandes and two other “dark-skinned
Cape Verdeans”183 alleged that they were not rehired by
Costa Brothers because of their race and color. The trial
court granted Costa Brothers’ motion for summary
judgment and the appellate court took the occasion to
present a treatise on how the courts have and should treat
Title VII intentional discrimination cases after Price
Waterhouse and the 1991 Act.184 The court asserted that
plaintiffs may prove “disparate treatment under Title VII”
either “on a mixed-motive approach or on a pretext
approach.”185 To protect the framework for the latter, the
court asserted, § 107 and the “motivating factor” standard
can be allowed to apply only to the former, for “[i]t is readily
apparent that th[e] mixed-motive approach, uncabined, has
the potential to swallow whole the traditional McDonnell
Douglas analysis.”186 Thus the court claimed that all courts
must protect the judiciary’s “traditional McDonnell Douglas
analysis” by restricting “access” to the legislatively set § 107
framework by demanding a special “quality” of evidence, as
described in “Justice O’Connor’s seminal concurrence in
Price Waterhouse.”187
181. Id. at 1210.
182. 199 F.3d 572 (1st Cir. 1999).
183. Id. at 577.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 579-80.
186. Id. at 580.
187. Id.
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After acknowledging the various lower court
interpretations of the “direct evidence” standard for
restricting “access” to the system set by Congress,188 the
Fernandes court chose what seems to be a variant on what
the court termed an “animus plus” interpretation.189 The
plaintiff’s evidence must show animus directly through
statements that are not ambiguous; “a statement that
plausibly can be interpreted two different ways—one
discriminatory and the other benign—does not directly
reflect illegal animus and, thus, does not constitute direct
evidence.”190 The Fernandes plaintiffs’ evidence that the
owner of Costa Brothers stated “I don’t need minorities, and
I don’t need residents on this job” and “I don’t have to hire
you locals or Cape Verdean people”191 were inadequate “to
unlatch the door” to the framework enacted by Congress
because they could be “plausibly” interpreted to mean that
the company did not have “to make special efforts to comply
with EEO requirements” of “some sort of quota system.”192
In other words, the court upheld the lower court’s refusal to
allow a jury as fact finder to apply the “motivating factor”
standard in determining what the employer meant by some
potentially inculpating, albeit ambiguous, statements
because the statements could be “plausibly” interpreted, in
favor of the movant for summary judgment, not to be
inculpating. Statements must allow fact finders only one
possible interpretation to “unlatch the door” to what
Congress enacted.
The Fernandes court did hold that the trial court should
have allowed the jury to consider the case as under the
188. The court found “three schools of thought”: a “Classic” position,
purporting to exclude any circumstantial evidence requiring an inference, for
which it cites Shorter, inter alia; an “Animus Plus” position, which requires
evidence of “conduct or statements that . . . reflect directly the alleged
discriminatory animus and . . . bear squarely on the contested employment
decision”; and an “Animus” position, used by a “few courts” to distinguish
evidence in some way directly probative of animus rather than merely probative
of the insufficiency of other motives. Id. at 581-82. The first option of course
adopts the evidentiary meaning of “direct,” while the other two options are
based on the Burdine meaning of direct.
189. Id. at 583.
190. Id. at 583.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 583-84.

2010]

THE CAUSATION STANDARD

117

McDonnell Douglas framework; the jury thus should have
been instructed to determine whether the plaintiff had
proved the employer’s explanation of hiring the most readily
available qualified workers was pretextual.193 The court
even acknowledged that the plaintiffs’ evidence of the
owner’s ambiguous statements concerning Cape Verdeans
would be relevant to the finding of pretext. Yet it is clear
that the court anticipated that the trial court would give a
jury instruction that required the plaintiff to prove the
falsity of the employer’s explanation and thus the necessity
of a discriminatory animus as motivation for the employer’s
refusal to rehire the plaintiffs. Because the owner’s
statements could be interpreted in favor of the employer
movant for summary judgment, the burden-shifting jury
instruction promised by the 1991 Act was not available to
plaintiffs.
The lower courts’ requirement that plaintiffs in some
cases must use the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework,
even after the 1991 Act, was in tension with two important
decisions of the Supreme Court in the decade after that
Act’s passage. First, in St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,194
the Court, relying heavily on Aikens, held that a fact finder
was not compelled to find the existence of actionable
discrimination after finding an employer’s proffered
legitimate reasons to be false or insufficient.195 The Hicks
decision, though criticized by the dissent and numerous
commentators for deflating the value of the McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine framework for plaintiffs,196 actually offered
193. 199 F.3d at 583-90. The court allows that the plaintiffs “might adduce
further evidence at trial that would warrant the district court in concluding that
mixed-motive analysis is appropriate and in framing its jury instructions
accordingly.” Id. at 590 n.9. Presumably that evidence would have to be of the
unambiguous direct variety that the court requires to “unlatch the door” to
applying the § 107 framework.
194. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
195. Id. at 511.
196. Id. at 525 (Souter, J., dissenting); see Mark S. Brodin, The Demise of
Circumstantial Proof in Employment Discrimination Litigation: St. Mary’s
Honor Center v. Hicks, Pretext, and the “Personality” Excuse, 18 BERKELEY. J.
EMP. & LAB. L. 183, 183-84 (1997); Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary’s Honor
Center v. Hicks: Questioning the Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997, 998
(1995); Susan K. Grebeldinger, How Can a Plaintiff Prove Intentional
Employment Discrimination If She Cannot Explore the Relevant Circumstances:
The Need for Broad Workforce and Time Parameters in Discovery, 74 DENV. U. L.
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promise that the Court would rein in the lower courts’
misuse of the framework against plaintiffs. Justice Scalia,
writing for a five-Justice majority in Hicks, stressed that
the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework was only a
model for structuring proof on the ultimate statutory
question of discrimination, not an interpretation of the
meaning of § 703(a)(1). Furthermore, Justice Scalia
explained, in accord with Aikens, once “the defendant has
succeeded in carrying its burden of production, the
McDonnell Douglas framework—with its presumptions and
burdens—is no longer relevant.”197 Justice Scalia thus
indicated that the purpose of the “framework” is only to
require the defendant to carry a burden of production; when
that has happened, the fact finder is to consider together all
relevant evidence, including evidence relevant to the prima
facie case and to the sufficiency of legitimate motives, but
also any other evidence directly relevant to the
determinative and ultimate issue–the existence of a
discriminatory motive.
The Hicks Court’s view of the limited function of the
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework was repeated by a
unanimous Court in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Products, Inc.198 In Reeves, the Court clarified that proof of
pretext, in addition to a prima facie case, may be adequate,
without further evidence of bias, to prove the existence of
discrimination.199 Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court
explained that once the defendant-employer in that case
met its burden to present evidence of a legitimate reason for
the challenged discharge, the “McDonnell framework”
“disappeared” and “the sole remaining issue was
‘discrimination vel non.’”200 Justice O’Connor further
explained that the plaintiff’s “[p]roof that the defendant’s
explanation is unworthy of credence is simply one form of
circumstantial evidence that is probative of intentional
discrimination”—evidence that “may be quite persuasive”
REV. 159, 168 (1996). But see Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate
Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2236 (1995) (concluding that
Hicks was correct and that McDonnell Douglas should be abandoned).
197. 509 U.S. at 510.
198. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
199. Id. at 147-48.
200. Id. at 142-43.
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but that is to be considered along with all of the other
evidence presented by the plaintiff.201 Then to determine
whether the defendant employer was entitled to a judgment
as a matter of law in Reeves, Justice O’Connor proceeded to
consider together all of the plaintiff’s evidence. This
evidence, “in addition to establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination and creating a jury issue as to the falsity of
the employer’s explanation,” also included evidence that the
employer’s decision maker expressed animus toward the
plaintiff’s protected status category;202 it thus suggested the
existence of a discriminatory motive, rather than merely the
insufficiency of a legitimate motive.
The Reeves decision was thereby in tension with the
lower courts’ construction of § 107 of the 1991 Act. By
requiring the lower courts to consider all of plaintiffs’
evidence together in determining the existence of
discrimination vel non, the decision seemed to question the
lower courts’ refusal to consider all of the plaintiffs’
evidence to determine the existence of discrimination as a
“motivating factor.”203 By confirming the limited function of
the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework as explained in
Hicks, the Reeves decision also seemed to challenge the
lower courts’ use of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine to justify
the preservation of a necessary causation standard in cases
lacking strong “direct evidence” of discrimination. Justice
O’Connor’s Reeves decision did not, however, directly
consider the lower courts’ use of her concurring opinion in
Price Waterhouse to restrict application of the “motivating
factor” causation standard adopted by Congress in the 1991
Act. That direct consideration awaited the Court in Desert
Palace.
B. Desert Palace: The Supreme Court Confirms Congress
Although some panel decisions in some courts of
appeals had suggested ways to avoid the “direct evidence”
201. Id. at 147.
202. Id. at 151-52.
203. For a discussion of the significant implications of the Reeves decision and
of the lower courts’ resistance to its command to consider all of plaintiffs’
evidence together, see Michael J. Zimmer, Slicing & Dicing of Individual
Disparate Treatment Law, 61 LA. L. REV. 577, 577-78 (2001).
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barrier,204 it was not until the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals’ 2002 en banc decision in Costa v. Desert Palace,
Inc.205 that a court of appeals fully rejected the post-1991 Act
relevance of Justice O’Connor’s “direct evidence” language,
and thereby recognized that § 107’s “motivating factor”
causation standard applies to all Title VII cases alleging
intentional discrimination.206 The Ninth Circuit decision
reviewed a lower court’s use of jury instructions that
advised, in accord with § 107: (1) that the plaintiff had to
show her gender was a “motivating factor” in the employer’s
imposition of adverse working conditions, and (2) if the
plaintiff made such a demonstration, the defendant could
avoid the assessment of damages if it proved that it would
have treated the plaintiff the same, even if gender had
played no role in its decisions. The employer argued that
the plaintiff should not have been granted this so called
“mixed-motive” jury instruction because her evidence did
not satisfy a “direct evidence” standard. The Ninth Circuit
held that “the plaintiff in any Title VII case may establish a
violation through a preponderance of evidence (whether
direct or circumstantial) that a protected characteristic
played ‘a motivating factor.’”207
In a unanimous decision affirming the Ninth Circuit,
the Supreme Court revived the promise of the 1991 Act by
rejecting the lower courts’ use of Justice O’Connor’s “direct
evidence” dicta to limit the application of the “motivating
factor” standard.208 The Court, in an opinion also by Justice
Thomas, held that to obtain a jury instruction under § 107,
a plaintiff need not make any “heightened showing” based
on “direct evidence;” instead, “a plaintiff need only present
sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that ‘“race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any
employment practice.’”209 Justice Thomas explained that the
Court did not need to determine the meaning of the Price
204. See Wright v. Southland Corp., 187 F.3d 1287, 1293-1303 (11th Cir.
1999); Tyler v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 1176, 1183-87 (2d Cir. 1992).
205. 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002).
206. Id. at 853.
207. Id. at 853-54.
208. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
209. Id. at 101 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1964)).
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Waterhouse holding on causation or whether Justice
O’Connor’s opinion and thus her “direct evidence” dicta was
controlling, because Price Waterhouse’s teaching on the
proof of discrimination was “abrogate[d]” by the 1991 Act.210
Justice Thomas stressed that the language of the Act
required only that plaintiffs “demonstrate” a forbidden
“motivating factor,” and defined “demonstrate” only to meet
“the burdens of production and persuasion” without any
limitation on the kind of evidence that can be relevant in
doing so.211 Justice O’Connor joined Justice Thomas’s
opinion and also offered a separate concurrence in which
she expressly acknowledged that the 1991 Act “codified a
new evidentiary rule” for the type of mixed-motive cases for
which she advanced her “direct evidence” standard in Price
Waterhouse.212
The Court’s rejection of the lower courts’ efforts to use
the “direct evidence” standard in order to preserve their
control of disparate treatment litigation through the
McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework raised the issue of
whether the framework was necessary or would survive. As
noted above,213 the Court in Hicks had already indicated
that the framework served no additional purpose after a
defendant had carried its burden of producing a legitimate
explanation for an adverse decision challenged with a prima
facie case of discriminatory intent. Moreover, a number of
academics, assuming that most defendants do not need to
be impelled to try to justify challenged decisions, both
predicted and advocated the eventual full demise of the
framework.214 The Court in Desert Palace did state in a
210. Id. at 98. Justice Thomas also noted that since the Court rejected any
evidentiary limitation on the applicability of § 107, it did not need to address the
second question on which it had granted certiorari: the appropriate reading of
any “direct evidence” standard. Id. at 101 n.3.
211. Id. at 99-101 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (1964)).
212. Id. at 102 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
213. See supra text accompanying note 197.
214. See, e.g., Henry L. Chambers Jr., The Effect of Eliminating Distinctions
Among Title VII Disparate Treatment Cases, 57 SMU L. REV. 83, 84 (2004);
William R. Corbett, McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6
U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 212-13 (2003); Kenneth R. Davis, Price-Fixing:
Refining the Price Waterhouse Standard and Individual Disparate Treatment
Law, 31 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 859 (2004). For pre-Desert Palace advocacy of the
view that § 107 should supplant the McDonnell Douglas framework, see Michael
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footnote that it need not “decide when, if ever, § 107 applies
outside of the mixed-motive context.”215 Yet if plaintiffs, as
the Court held, can use any evidence to prove contributing
causation under § 107, why would they fashion their case as
one that required proof of single motivation and thus sole
causation? The Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision in the case
had suggested that mixed-motive cases warranting jury
instructions based on § 107 are ones “in which the evidence
could support a finding that discrimination is one of two or
more reasons for the challenged decision.”216 but the court
did not explain how evidence could not support such a
finding and still warrant sending a case to a jury. After all,
where the evidence is insufficient to support the existence of
a discriminatory reason, summary judgment should be
granted to the defendant, and in the rare case where the
evidence is so compelling as to exclude the possibility of any
other reason but discriminatory motivation, summary
judgment should be granted to the plaintiff.217
There is in fact, however, a good explanation for the
Ninth Circuit’s distinction of mixed-motive cases from
single-motive cases based on “the type of evidence
offered.”218 If all of a plaintiff’s evidence is probative of the
existence of a discriminatory motive only by demonstrating
the absence of any other motive, including any legitimate
motive proffered by the defendant, then that evidence
J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment
Discrimination Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563, 601-06 (1996). Professor Zimmer
adhered to this view after Desert Palace. Michael J. Zimmer, The New
Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse Is Dead, Whither McDonnell Douglas?,
53 EMORY L. J. 1887, 1927-29 (2004). For a dissenting view, see Steven J.
Kaminshine, Disparate Treatment as a Theory of Discrimination: The Need for a
Restatement, Not a Revolution, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 1, 42-51 (2005) (contending
that McDonnell Douglas-Burdine cases should be treated differently, at least
where plaintiffs’ proof is primarily of pretext).
215. 539 U.S. at 94 n.1.
216. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 856 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc),
aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
217. Cf. Charles A. Sullivan, Disparate Impact: Looking Past the Desert Palace
Mirage, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 911, 935 (2005) (“In any discrimination case
that gets to the jury, including a purely circumstantial evidence case, the jury
can find the presence of both factors, rather than deciding that one party is
entirely correct and the other wrong.”).
218. Desert Palace, 299 F.3d at 857.
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cannot “support a finding that discrimination is one of two
or more reasons for the challenged decision.”219 In such
cases, as a matter of logic, a plaintiff can prove contributing
causation only by proving at least the insufficiency of
alternative causation and thus the necessary causation of
the discriminatory motive.
This does not mean that where a plaintiff has proof only
of the insufficiency of alternative causation, the plaintiff
must prove necessary causation because the contributing
causation standard of § 107 does not apply; it simply means
that the plaintiff proves necessary causation by proving
contributing causation. As suggested by the Ninth Circuit in
Desert Palace, this may affect jury instructions, including
obviating any instruction on the employer’s “same decision”
affirmative defense, as in these cases it would be logically
inconsistent for a jury to find both that discrimination was a
“motivating factor” and that the employer would have made
the same decision but for discriminatory bias.220 As the
Ninth Circuit also stressed, however, this does not mean
that mixed-motive cases and single-motive cases are
“fundamentally different” or that a jury’s consideration of
the latter is to be controlled by complicated instructions
explaining the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework.221
Desert Palace should be read to confirm that § 107 sets the
causation standard for all Title VII cases, that any “direct
evidence” limitation on this standard has been abrogated,
that the function of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
framework is only to require defendants to offer specific
justifications for adverse employment actions, that this
framework does not define a separate cause of action from
that of § 107, and that jury instructions are to be based on
§ 107 except possibly in those cases where the plaintiffs’
evidence could not support “a finding that discrimination is
one of two or more reasons for the challenged decision.”222

219. Id. at 856.
220. Id. at 856-57.
221. Id. at 857.
222. Id. at 856.
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C. The Lower Courts Resist
Unfortunately, some lower courts have read Desert
Palace much more narrowly. By cleaving to the McDonnell
Douglas-Burdine framework, several courts of appeals have
continued to pronounce doctrine that allows trial courts to
deny plaintiffs the opportunity to use all kinds of evidence
to prove illegal discrimination to juries using the
“motivating factor” causation standard.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, the court issuing
the decision reviewed in Gross, has rendered the most
narrow,
and
most
obviously
incorrect,
express
interpretation of Desert Palace. In Griffith v. City of Des
Moines, this court pronounced that since Desert Palace
concerned jury instructions, the decision did not require the
abrogation of a “direct evidence” standard to determine
whether a plaintiff could avoid summary judgment without
use of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework.223 The
court stated that while Desert Palace controls jury
deliberations, plaintiffs could still be required to have
“strong (direct) evidence that illegal discrimination
motivated the employer’s adverse action” as a condition of
not using “the three-part McDonnell Douglas analysis to get
to the jury.”224 As explained by Judge Magnuson in a
decision concurring because of plaintiff’s generally weak
evidence, however, this distinction of the standard for
summary judgment from that for jury deliberations “is
absurd”; it “requires the plaintiff to prove at summary
judgment that an invidious characteristic was the but-for
cause of the employment action, but then at trial only
requires the plaintiff to prove that this characteristic was a
motivating factor in the employment decision.”225 This
cannot be what the Desert Palace Court intended when it
determined that the 1991 Act had abrogated the teaching of
Price Waterhouse on causation in Title VII disparate
treatment cases and that all forms of evidence should be
considered together to determine the existence of
discrimination as a motivating factor. Although the Griffith
court used “direct evidence” not as “the converse of
circumstantial evidence,” but rather, as did the Court in
223. 387 F.3d 733, 735-36 (8th Cir. 2004).
224. Id. at 736.
225. Id. at 739, 745 n.9.

2010]

THE CAUSATION STANDARD

125

Burdine, to refer to evidence directly linking a challenged
adverse decision to discriminatory bias, the court’s approach
would allow trial courts considering motions for summary
judgment to consider only “strong” Burdine-type “direct”
evidence when evaluating the existence of discrimination as
a “motivating factor.”226
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, without offering
an express interpretation of Desert Palace,227 has seemed to
join the Eighth Circuit in continuing to use a “direct
evidence” test in its analysis of summary judgment motions.
For instance, in Burstein v. Emtel, Inc.,228 the court upheld a
trial court’s grant of summary judgment against Burstein
because he had only “circumstantial evidence of
discrimination” and he could not prove that Emtel’s “many
legitimate reasons” for refusing to renew his employment
contract were “a pretext” for religious discrimination.229
Since the court did not consider Burstein’s testimony about
anti-Semitic comments from his supervisor to be “direct
evidence” of discriminatory bias—as the comments were not

226. The Griffith court claimed that its refusal to find Desert Palace’s holding
relevant to its analysis of a summary judgment motion was justified by the
Court’s use of the McDonnell Douglas framework to consider the grant of
summary judgment in a case, Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540 U.S. 44 (2003),
alleging intentional discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act
(ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12103 (2006). Griffith, 387 F.3d at 735. The Court in
Raytheon, however, did not suggest that its holding in Desert Palace rejecting
Justice O’Connor’s “direct evidence” standard was not relevant to the analysis of
summary judgment motions. The Raytheon Court held only that a neutral
business policy, such as Raytheon’s rule against hiring previously terminated
employees, that has been adopted for non-discriminatory reasons, can be
challenged only under disparate impact analysis, which in this case the plaintiff
had failed timely to raise. The Court used the McDonnell Douglas framework
because the lower courts had done so and to highlight how the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals panel had blended McDonnell Douglas improperly with
disparate impact analysis. Raytheon, 540 U.S. at 49-53. The Court gave no
consideration, even in dicta, to whether the McDonnell Douglas framework
offers a separate cause of action with a different causation standard than that
offered by § 107 of the 1991 Act. Id.
227. See, e.g., Cooper v. Southern Co., 390 F.3d 695, 725 n.17 (11th Cir. 2004)
(“[A]fter Desert Palace was decided, this Court has continued to apply the
McDonnell Douglas analysis in non-mixed-motive cases.”).
228. 137 F. App’x 205 (11th Cir. 2005).
229. Id. at 208-09.
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probative “without inference”230—the court required
Burstein to prove the absence or at least insufficiency of the
legitimate reasons and thus that religious bias was a
necessary cause of his non-renewal.231
The post-Desert Palace approach of the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals to the analysis of summary judgment
motions in disparate treatment cases, while more consistent
with the Desert Palace decision than the approach of the
Eighth and Eleventh Circuits, also could allow trial court
judges to continue to thwart the full promise of the 1991 Act
by forcing a plaintiff’s evidence into the McDonnell DouglasBurdine framework. In Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., a
pre-Gross ADEA decision, the Fifth Circuit held that Desert
Palace signals or at least permits a “merging of the
McDonnell Douglas and Price Waterhouse approaches.”232
The Fifth Circuit’s merged framework conditions a
plaintiff’s access to the jury on his or her demonstration, as
in the McDonnell Douglas approach, of “a prima facie case
230. Id. at 208 n.6. The court stressed that Burstein had no proof to question
Emtel’s claims that the supervisor did not participate in the decision not to offer
Burstein a new contract. Id. at 208. There was testimony, however, that both
Burstein and the supervisor discussed with the decision makers the argument
in which the anti-Semitic comments were made, and that Burstein’s “[a]nger
and hostility” in that argument, but apparently not the comments, concerned
the decision makers. Id. at 207.
231. Id. at 207. For another example of the Eleventh Circuit’s retention of a
necessary causation standard in cases lacking evidence that fails to meet a strict
“direct evidence” standard, see Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 129 F. App’x 529 (11th
Cir. 2005), vacated, 546 U.S. 454 (2006). In Ash, the court found that the
decision maker’s frequent reference to the African American plaintiffs as “boys”
was not “direct evidence” of discrimination because the references were “too
remote in time” from the contested decisions not to promote plaintiffs. Id. at
533. Then analyzing the case as one in which the plaintiffs were required to
prove necessary causation through proof of pretext, the court also found Ash’s
evidence of pretext to be inadequate, applying standards on which Ash’s lawyer
convinced the Supreme Court to provide clarification. See Ash, 546 U.S. at 457
(holding that use of the word “boy” without modification is not “always benign”
and that “jumping off the page to slap you in the face” is an imprecise standard
for inferring pretext from comparative qualifications of candidates for jobs).
Upon remand the court of appeals adhered to its determination that Ash had
not proved pretext, and thus necessary causation, because “[t]here was
insufficient evidence of bias in the circumstances of this case to overcome the
articulated reasons for [the plant manager’s] decision.” Ash v. Tyson Foods, Inc.,
190 F. App’x 924, 926 (11th Cir. 2006).
232. 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).

2010]

THE CAUSATION STANDARD

127

of discrimination,” and then if the defendant “articulate[s] a
legitimate, non-discriminatory reason,” on the creation of a
genuine issue of material fact “either” that the defendant’s
reason is a pretext for discrimination or that plaintiff’s
protected characteristic was another “motivating factor.”233
There are two problematic aspects of the Rachid court’s
attempt to retain a central role for McDonnell Douglas
through its ‘’merged’’ framework. First, the requirement
that all plaintiffs must prove a McDonnell Douglas-type
prima facie case is inconsistent with the Court’s holding in
Aikens, as confirmed in Hicks, that the function of the
prima facie is only to require a defendant to articulate a
legitimate reason. Applied strictly, the requirement could
prevent a plaintiff who could not, say, establish basic
qualifications for a job for which he unsuccessfully applied,
to convince a jury, based on evidence of comments from
decision makers, that he was not even considered because of
his race.
Second, and probably pertinent to more cases, is the
path provided by the Rachid framework for trial courts to
more easily grant summary judgment against plaintiffs by
treating their cases as those requiring proof of pretext, and
thus necessary causation, rather than as those requiring
proof only of discrimination as a motivating factor. The path
is provided by the suggestion that proof of pretext is an
alternative to proof of discrimination as a “motivating
factor,” rather than one type of evidence, to consider with
other types, to determine whether the plaintiff can prove
the existence of discriminatory motivation. In the Rachid
case, the court did not take this path. The court instead
considered together evidence of comments demonstrating
Rachid’s supervisor’s discriminatory animus and evidence
challenging the employer’s legitimate purported reason for
Rachid’s termination, and reversed the trial court’s grant of
summary judgment without specifying that the plaintiff
could only be successful at trial through a mixed-motive, or
alternatively, through a single-motive theory by proof of
pretext.
Since the Rachid decision, however, courts in the Fifth
Circuit have not always applied its merged framework so
flexibly. Consider, for instance, the analysis in Gillaspy v.
233. Id.
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Dallas Independent School District.234 In that case, the court
reviewed a district court’s grant of summary judgment
against Gillaspy on her claims that she was subjected to
gender discrimination by several decisions of her employer
to not promote her to better supervisory posts.235 Gillaspy’s
evidence included her testimony that one of the managers
who interviewed her just before her first rejection for a
promotion had told her that “only men” would be hired for
the position she sought.236 In direct conflict with Desert
Palace and probably with Rachid as well, the court first
held that Gillaspy had no viable “direct-evidence claim”
because her testimony about the manager’s comment was
not probative of discriminatory motivation “without
inference” of how that manager might have influenced the
employer’s decision.237 The court acknowledged that Rachid
had held that plaintiffs can use circumstantial evidence
within the McDonnell Douglas framework to prove
discrimination as a “motivating factor” as well as to prove
the pretext of the employer’s proffered legitimate
motivations,238 but stated that the plaintiff had to prove
pretext because she “ha[d] not sufficiently not [sic] argued
that . . . her gender was a motivating factor in the
challenged employment decisions.”239 Ultimately, based on
the plaintiff’s additional evidence of pretext, the court found
that summary judgment should not have been granted on
the plaintiff’s claims of gender discrimination on two of the
three promotions considered by the court.240 It did so,
however, based only on the evidence being adequate to
support a conclusion that the employer’s proffered reasons
for these two failures to promote Gillaspy were inadequate
and thus that discriminatory motivation was necessary.241
234. 278 F. App’x 307 (5th Cir. 2008).
235. Gillaspy v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 3:04-CV-2055-K, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 69211 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2006), rev’d in part, 278 F. App’x 307 (5th Cir.
2008).
236. Gillaspy, 278 F. App’x at 309.
237. Id. at 311-12 (quoting Sandstad v. CB Richard Ellis, Inc., 309 F.3d 893,
897 (5th Cir. 2002)).
238. Id. at 312-13.
239. Id. at 313 n.3.
240. Id. at 314.
241. Id.
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For the third non-promotion, the court found no adequate
rebuttal of the existence of the legitimate motivation and
thus a proper dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim.242
Other circuit courts of appeal after Desert Palace, by
preserving the McDonnell Douglas framework as an
alternative cause of action requiring the full proof of pretext
and necessary causation rather than only as a residual tool
to assist plaintiffs in the proof of motivating factor
causation, have also left the door open for trial courts to
continue to require some plaintiffs to prove necessary
causation. For instance, in Fogg v. Gonzales, the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals held that the McDonnell
Douglas framework for proving pretext and thus single
discriminatory motivation or sole causation was not only a
separate methodology of proof, but also an entirely separate
cause of action, as provided in § 703(a)(1) of Title VII.243 The
court, through somewhat tortured circular reasoning that
avoided close analysis of the statutory text or of the
legislative history of the 1991 Act, read § 107 to provide an
alternative cause of action that requires proof of only a
motivating factor in cases litigated under a “mixed-motive”
theory.244 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals in an otherwise
242. Id. The court cited Laxton v. Gap, Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 578 (5th Cir. 2003),
for the proposition that a “plaintiff must rebut each nondiscriminatory reason
articulated by the employer.” Gillaspy, 278 F. App’x at 314. For other postRachid decisions of panels of the Fifth Circuit that have upheld motions of
summary judgment against plaintiffs because they failed, despite having
evidence of discriminatory bias, to offer adequate proof of necessary causation
by eliminating an employer’s proffered justification, see, for example, Ajao v.
Bed Bath & Beyond Inc., 265 F. App’x 258 (5th Cir. 2008); and Bugos v. Ricoh
Corp., No. 07-20757, 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 18311 (5th Cir. Aug. 21, 2008).
243. 492 F.3d 447 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
244. Id. at 452-54. The Fogg court argued that reading § 703(m) to provide
meaning to § 703(a)(1), rather than to provide an alternative cause of action
would effect a disfavored implied repeal of a cause of action formerly available
to plaintiffs. Id. This reasoning is circular because it assumes that § 703(m)
provides a new cause of action, rather than a clarification, through specification
of a causation standard, of the causes of action provided for in other Title VII
provisions, including § 703(a)(1). Id. As explained above, this assumption is in
tension with the language of § 703(m) and the clear intent of Congress to reject
the causation standard provided these provisions by the Court in Price
Waterhouse. See supra text accompanying notes 95-97. Furthermore, if § 703(m)
provided a cause of action separate from that of § 703(a)(1), rather than a
causation standard governing § 703(a)(1), then Price Waterhouse would stand as
a governing precedent for § 703(a)(1) actions. The Fogg court seems to be
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excellent opinion, White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., also
expressly treated § 703(a)(1) and § 703(m) as separate
causes of action that require use of methodologies of proof
and of different standards of causation.245
It might be argued that interpreting § 107 to allow
plaintiffs’ lawyers to choose in each case whether to use the
McDonnell Douglas framework to prove a single or at least
necessary discriminatory cause or rather to use all relevant
probative evidence to prove discrimination as a “motivating
factor” cannot deny the promise of the 1991 Act, because
plaintiffs’ lawyers can and always will choose to gain the
benefit of the latter, more liberal causation standard. This
argument seems particularly applicable to the choice offered
by the Sixth Circuit panel in White, as the court there made
clear that choice of the “mixed-motive” cause of action and
the accompanying motivating factor causation standard
does not preclude plaintiffs from using McDonnell Douglas
to present at least some of their evidence of discriminatory
bias through evidence of employer pretext.246 Indeed, in
White, to support its finding that the plaintiff presented
concerned that plaintiffs not be denied use of the McDonnell Douglas framework
without
an
express
directive
from
Congress.
Reading
§ 703(m) as Congress intended to provide a causation standard, however, does
not effect a repeal of the judicially fashioned McDonnell Douglas framework as
an aid to plaintiffs in proving discriminatory motivation; rather, it insures that
the framework is used only as such an aid, rather than as a means to continue
to impose a burden on some Title VII plaintiffs to show necessary causation. The
Fogg decision used its specious implied-repeal analysis to reject an effort by the
defendant to litigate a “same decision” defense to limit remedies after a jury had
already found discriminatory motivation, apparently primarily on the basis of
evidence of pretext. 492 F.3d at 454. The court presumably could have reached
the same conclusion by finding that the defendant had waived its defense by not
asking for a jury instruction that allowed it to prove the absence of necessary
causation.
245. 533 F.3d 381, 400 n.10 (6th Cir. 2008) (“[T]he McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine framework continues to guide our summary judgment
analysis of single-motive discrimination claims brought pursuant only to Title
VII’s general anti-discrimination provision, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and not
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m).”); see also Diamond v. Colonial Life &
Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318 (4th Cir. 2005).
246. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381 (6th Cir. 2008). The court
in White stated that, “A Title VII plaintiff may certainly find parts of the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine framework to be useful in presenting a mixedmotive claim.” Id. at 401 (relying on Wright v. Murray Guard, Inc., 455 F.3d
702, 720 (6th Cir. 2006) (Moore, J., concurring)).
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sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that race
was a motivating factor in the employer’s issuance of the
plaintiff’s downgraded performance evaluation, the court
considered evidence that the defendant’s reason for using a
particular evaluation “grid” was pretextual, as well as
evidence of the evaluator’s discriminatory bias.247
Yet interpreting the 1991 Act to provide plaintiffs a
choice between proving necessary causation through pretext
and contributing causation through general “mixed-motive”
proof ultimately is not faithful to the statute’s promise.
Some plaintiffs’ attorneys might choose, or be compelled by
their clients to choose, to carry the burden of proving the
insufficiency of the employer’s legitimate reasons by
expressly claiming to litigate their case as a “single-motive”
or pretext case under McDonnell Douglas in order to deny
juries the compromise option of finding the employer liable
for illegal discrimination, but not for significant legal or
equitable remedies. The option to so gamble may seem
attractive from the perspective of plaintiffs and their
attorneys, but it is not the compromise struck between the
deterrent and compensatory goals of Title VII by Congress
in § 107 of the 1991 Act.248
More significantly, however, courts that recognize two
causes of action for disparate treatment under Title VII may
not allow plaintiffs to choose the “mixed-motive” option in
cases where the plaintiffs argue that the employer’s
proffered motive was pretextual. For instance, in a District
of Columbia Circuit panel decision written by the same
judge who authored Fogg, the court upheld a summary
judgment against plaintiffs because they argued that the
defendant’s proffered legitimate motives were intended to
cover up discriminatory motives, even though the court
acknowledged that the plaintiffs might have had a
“compelling case” had they argued only that race was one
motivating factor.249 Courts recognizing two disparate
247. Id. at 404-06.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 243-44. Thus, in any case in which the
jury conceivably could find discrimination to be a “motivating factor” without
also finding it to be a necessary cause, defendants as well as plaintiffs should be
able to obtain a jury instruction like that given in Desert Palace. See supra text
accompanying notes 106-07.
249. Ginger v. Dist. of Columbia, 527 F.3d 1340, 1345 (D.C. Cir. 2008)
(Ginsburg, J.).
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treatment causes of action—including future panels in the
Sixth Circuit diverging from the White court’s analysis—
might also treat common cases where a plaintiff’s strongest
evidence of discrimination is evidence of pretext as having
been litigated as single-motive cases, regardless of the
express arguments or claims of the plaintiffs. Doing so
would enable the court to require adequate evidence to
prove the insufficiency of each of the employer’s
justifications and thus the existence of discriminatory
motivation as a necessary, rather than only contributing,
cause.
In sum, lower court decisions after Desert Palace, like
earlier decisions after passage of the 1991 Act, teach the
lesson that the message sent by Congress through § 107 was
not sufficiently clear. Given the confusion and the split in
the circuits over the meaning of Desert Palace, absent a
Congressional response to Gross for Title VII as well as for
the ADEA, the Court probably would have to again grant
certiorari to explain what plaintiffs must prove to establish
discriminatory motivation in a disparate treatment
employment discrimination case. It would have to do so to
clarify that the premise of its holding on jury instructions in
Desert Palace applies to the analysis of motions for
summary judgment as well as to motions for judgments as a
matter of law. Another decision on causation under Title VII
would ideally also clarify that § 703(m) does not provide an
alternative cause of action for something termed “mixedmotive” cases, but instead provides the standard of
causation for all Title VII cases in which illegal intentional
discrimination is alleged. This decision, despite the
preference shown by five Justices in Gross for a necessary
causation standard, ideally would also reject any suggestion
that the lower courts can apply such a “but-for” standard in
cases in which the courts determine that the plaintiff’s
arguments and evidence are primarily directed toward
showing that the employer’s justifications for the challenged
decision are pretextual.250
250. The Court could accomplish these clarifications, for instance, in a case
like Ash v. Tyson Foods, 190 F. App’x 924 (11th Cir. 2006). See supra note 231 in
which a plaintiff seeking to avoid summary judgment has supplemented some
circumstantial evidence of discriminatory bias with use of the McDonnell
Douglas framework to advance evidence of employer pretext, but unlike the
plaintiff in Ash, argues that he needs to prove only that discriminatory bias was
one motivating factor rather than the single motivating factor in producing the
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IV. FULFILLING THE PROMISE
A. An Effective Legislative Response
In responding to the Court’s decision in Gross, Congress
should appreciate both the confusion created by § 107 and
the unlikelihood of that confusion being fully resolved by a
Court assertively allegiant to necessary causation as a
strong default standard. Such appreciation should insure
that a Congress that wants to maintain the policy
compromise expressed in § 107 as the default standard for
employment law generally,251 not do so by simply inserting a
provision like § 107 into the ADEA and other employment
statutes. Congress instead can better insure the judicial
implementation of a motivating factor causation standard
supplemented with a same decision affirmative defense to
limit remedies in one of two alternative ways.

challenged decision. The Court could also do so by confirming the post-Desert
Palace position of a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ panel that in a case where a
plaintiff has evidence both of an employer’s proffered legitimate motive being
pretextual and also of discriminatory intent, “it is not particularly significant”
whether a plaintiff first relied on the “McDonnell Douglas presumption” to
impel the defendant to produce evidence of the legitimate motive. McGinest v.
GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1123 (9th Cir. 2004). Regardless of the
plaintiff’s use of McDonnell Douglas to frame the case, as explained by the
Ninth Circuit, the plaintiff “must produce some evidence suggesting that [the
employer’s] failure to promote him was due in part or whole to discriminatory
intent.” Id. (emphasis added). Confirming this position of the Ninth Circuit, like
reversing the Eleventh Circuit’s use of McDonnell Douglas, would resolve the
residual ambiguity left by the first footnote in Desert Palace, reserving the
applicability of the holding “outside of the mixed-motive context.” It would make
clear that “motivating factor” is the correct causation standard, regardless of the
kind of evidence presented by the plaintiff.
251. A Congress supportive of the § 107 compromise presumably would want
to extend it to other employment law prohibitions. The balance between a
concern with under enforcement and a concern with over compensation should
not differ depending on the type of discrimination or retaliation prohibited.
Since plaintiffs in all types of intentional discrimination cases confront the same
difficulty in proving a wrongful state of mind, all such cases pose the same
concern that many, perhaps most, meritorious cases will not be provable if
typical plaintiffs with imperfect employment records must prove necessary
causation. A concern that undeserving plaintiffs not receive compensatory relief
in cases where they would have been treated the same but for the employer’s
discriminatory motive also is relevant to any type of discrimination prohibition.
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First, the motivating factor causation standard could be
woven into the text of the statutory provisions upon which
disparate treatment prohibitions are based, such as §
703(a)(1) of Title VII or § 623(a)(1) of the ADEA, rather than
added as a supplementary provision, such as § 703(m) of
Title VII. For instance, Congress could amend both §
703(a)(1) and § 623(a)(1) by substituting “when” for
“because of” and adding at the end of the provision, “was a
motivating factor.” The provisions thus would read in
pertinent part: “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any
individual . . . when such individual’s race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin [or age, in the case of § 623(a)(1)] was
a motivating factor.” The defendant’s “same action”
affirmative defense to avoid significant remedies through
demonstration of the absence of necessary causation could
remain in the statute’s provisions on remedies, as the §
107(b) affirmative defense was added to § 706(g) of Title
VII.252 Such an amendment would make clear that
contributing cause is the standard for liability for illegality
in all disparate treatment cases under the respective
statute, and also that defendants who can demonstrate that
they would have made the same decision absent
consideration of a forbidden factor have the right to avoid
specified remedies, such as back-pay, reinstatement, and
legal damages.
Alternatively, Congress could simply add a definition of
“because” to any employment statute—like Title VII or the
ADEA, or the ADA or FMLA—for which it determined a
contributing causation standard and a same-decision
defense for remedies were appropriate. The definition could
simply read: The term “because” includes being “a
contributing cause, even if not a necessary or sufficient
cause.” The affirmative defense could remain, or be placed,
in the remedial provisions of the statute.
The latter alternative would have the benefit of
obviating the need to amend multiple provisions of the
relevant employment statutes. Section 703 of Title VII, for
instance, as noted above, contains separate provisions
proscribing discrimination by employment agencies and by
252. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(A)-(B) (2006). The cognate provision
covering remedies in the ADEA is 29 U.S.C. § 626(b) (2006).
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labor organizations.253 Section 623 of the ADEA has similar
separate provisions.254 The definitional alternative could
also be expanded easily to reach the separate treatment in §
717 of Title VII,255 and of § 15 of the ADEA,256 of
discrimination by federal government employers “based on”
one of the Title VII categories or age.257 Furthermore,
§ 703(a)’s and § 623(a)’s proscriptions of discrimination by
employers both include an alternative definition of
discrimination as “to limit, segregate, or classify . . . in any
way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities . . . because of” a protected
status.258 The causation standard for this provision could be
clarified more directly and with less redrafting simply by
adding the new definitional section.259 Similarly, a new
253. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (2006) (employment agencies); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e2(c) (labor organizations).
254. 29 U.S.C. § 623(b), (c) (2006).
255. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (2006). Subsection (a) states that “[a]ll personnel
actions affecting employees or applicants for employment” with covered units of
the federal government “shall be made free from any discrimination based on
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”
256. 29 U.S.C. § 633a (2006).
257. The expansion could be effected either by having the contributing cause
definition apply to “based on” as well as “because,” or by changing the “based on”
phrase to “because of.”
258. Each provision states that it “shall be unlawful for an employer—to limit,
segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in any way
which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual’s” protected status.
259. The Title VII disparate impact cause of action was originally based on
this provision, before the codification of this action in § 703(k) by § 105 of the
1991 Act. The age-based disparate impact cause of action continues to be based
on a similar provision in § 623(a)(2) of the ADEA. See Smith v. City of Jackson,
544 U.S. 228, 233-35 (2005). The issue of causation generally is less salient in
disparate impact cases than in disparate treatment cases because the former
turn on the effects and justifications of particular employment practices and
thus do not require untangling complicated subjective motivations. Contributing
rather than necessary causation, however, is the more appropriate standard for
disparate impact cases because plaintiffs have to prove only that a particular,
and unjustified, employment practice disproportionately disadvantages their
protected class, regardless of the relative ultimate success of the class in the
challenged decision-making process. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 451
(1982) (employer cannot compensate for the discriminatory effects of an
employment practice by reaching a non discriminatory “bottom line” through
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definition of “because” would provide the most direct and
most simple route to clarification of the causation standard
for the more complicated definition of discrimination in the
ADA, which includes both a general prohibition of
discrimination using the “because of” phrase,260 and some
more specific prohibitions that use the same phrase.261
Finally, providing a contributing cause definition of
“because” in employment discrimination statutes would
clarify that anti-retaliation provisions such as § 704 in Title
VII,262 and § 623(d) of the ADEA,263 are to be governed by the
other practices). This holding, and its implicit adoption of a contributing cause
standard, is not affected by § 703(k)(1)(B)(i) now requiring plaintiffs to
demonstrate “that each particular challenged employment practice causes a
disparate impact.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(B)(i) (2006).
260. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) (“No covered entity shall discriminate against a
qualified individual with a disability because of the disability of such individual
in regard to job application procedures, the hiring, advancement, or discharge of
employees, employee compensation, job training, and other terms, conditions,
and privileges of employment.”).
261. See 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(1), (4) (2006). The list of specific prohibitions in
the ADA is presented as non-exclusive constructions. Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006), which prescribes the
exclusion from participation in “any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance” of any individual “solely by reason of her or his disability”
is an example of a statutory provision that sets a specific causation standard
other than the one that Congress embraced in § 107 of the 1991 Act. §
12112(b)(1), (4). Most courts of appeals, however, have not imported this “sole”
causation standard into cases charging disability discrimination under the ADA,
as the latter statute uses the “because of” language of section 703(a)(1) of Title
VII rather than the “solely by reason” language of the Rehabilitation Act. See,
e.g., Head v. Glacier Nw. Inc., 413 F.3d 1053, 1063-64 n.55, 1065 (9th Cir. 2005)
(collecting cases from other circuits). As noted above, the Court’s use of the
McDonnell Douglas framework in its decision in Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez, 540
U.S. 44 (2003), does not establish any particular continuing role for this
framework in disparate treatment litigation, whether under the ADA or in
employment discrimination litigation more generally. See supra note 226.
262. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2006) states:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against any of his employees or applicants for
employment, for an employment agency, or joint labor-management
committee controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining,
including on-the-job training programs, to discriminate against any
individual, or for a labor organization to discriminate against any
member thereof or applicant for membership, because he has opposed
any practice made an unlawful employment practice by this
subchapter, or because he has made a charge, testified, assisted, or
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same causation standards that govern anti-discrimination
provisions.264 Provisions that proscribe discrimination
against employees because they oppose illegal status
discrimination or participate in processes established to
eliminate such discrimination do not pose different
considerations for causation than do provisions directly
prohibiting the status discrimination. Anti-retaliation
provisions are not less important than are antidiscrimination provisions, as the former typically are
adopted to protect the latter. The primary purpose of antiretaliation provisions in any employment statute is to
secure the underlying rights promised by the statute by
protecting those who assert or assist in the implementation
of these rights.265 Indeed, the Court has interpreted several
participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing
under this subchapter.
Id.
263. The wording of the anti-retaliation provision in the ADEA, 29 U.S.C.
§ 623(d) (2006), does not vary in substance from that of Title VII.
264. Such clarification is necessary even for retaliation claims under § 704 of
Title VII because the terms of § 703(m) apply only to discrimination on the basis
of one of the five Title VII protected status categories, not to discrimination
against opposition to status discrimination or for participation in Title VII
processes. Thus, some courts have applied the direct evidence distinction to §
704
claims.
See,
e.g.,
Imwalle
v.
Reliance
Med.
Prods.,
515 F.3d 531, 543-544 (6th Cir. 2008) (distinguishing between direct and
circumstantial evidence for Title VII and ADEA retaliation claims). Other
courts, in less persuasive opinions, have applied a more stringent standard. See,
e.g., Kant v. Seton Hall Univ., 279 F. App’x 152, 159 (3d Cir. 2008) (plaintiff’s
burden in Title VII retaliation case includes proving that retaliation “had a
determinative effect on the outcome” of decision-making process); Van Horn v.
Best Buy Stores, L.P., 526 F.3d 1144, 1148 (8th Cir. 2008) (retaliation claim
under Title VII requires proof that retaliation was a “‘determinative–not merely
motivating–factor’” (quoting Carrington v. City of Des Moines, 481 F.3d 1046,
1053 (8th Cir. 2007))). But cf. Fye v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 516 F.3d 1217, 1225
n.5 (10th Cir. 2008) (declining to decide whether § 107 framework applies to
retaliation claims under Title VII).
265. This is true regardless of whether the anti-retaliation provision is limited
to protecting individuals only for invoking or participating in formal processes
under the statute, or like § 704(a) of Title VII, which also protects individuals
for reasonable opposition to the denial of an anti-discrimination right or other
benefit under the statute. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Act § 15(a)(3), 29
U.S.C. § 215(A)(3) (2006) (protecting individuals only for invoking or
participating in formal processes under the statute). It is also true regardless of
whether the range of employer actions covered by an anti-retaliation provision
is more broad or narrow than that covered by an anti-discrimination guaranty
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anti-discrimination provisions in federal statutes to
encompass an implied prohibition of retaliation against
opposition to the prohibited discrimination.266
Moreover, there is no reason to assume that a subjective
retaliatory motive for an employment decision is ultimately
easier to prove than is a discriminatory motive. Just as the
minority status of an adversely treated and objectively
qualified employee can raise the suspicion of discrimination,
the temporal proximity between an adverse employment
action and the assertion of a statutory right can raise the
suspicion of retaliation. In both situations, however, an
employer can dispel the suspicion with evidence of some
other reason for its employment action. Indeed, it seems
more likely that employers can fashion ex ante credible
justifications against imperfect employees in reaction to
their assertion of statutory rights than they can find ex post
credible justifications for discriminatory decisions taken by
some of their managers. Some may not wish to condemn an
employer’s agent’s proven consideration of an employee’s
charge of discrimination or other assertion of a statutory
right in cases where it is unclear whether the employer
would have taken the challenged adverse action but for the
consideration. If the employer, because of a “same decision”
defense to remedies, cannot be forced to change the decision
or pay any form of compensation in a case where it can
prove the sufficiency of its justification, however, why would
reasonable legislators want consideration of an employee’s
protected assertion of statutory rights to be treated as more
acceptable than discriminatory animus that ultimately
that it protects. Cf. Burlington N. & S. F. R. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63-67
(2006) (interpreting, in dicta, § 704(a) of Title VII to cover a broader range of
potentially adverse employer actions than those concerning “employment and
the workplace” covered by § 703(a)).
266. See, e.g., Crocs West, Inc. v. Humphries, 128 S. Ct. 1951 (2008)
(confirming that race discrimination prohibition in 42 U.S.C. § 1981
encompasses anti-retaliation prohibition); Gomez-Perez v. Potter, 128 S. Ct.
1931 (2008) (finding anti-retaliation prohibition implicit in age discrimination
prohibition against federal government employers in § 633a(a) of the ADEA);
Jackson v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 544 U.S. 167 (2005) (finding antiretaliation prohibition implicit in the prohibition of sex discrimination in Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)); see also Sullivan
v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (finding that race
discrimination prohibition in 42 U.S.C. § 1982 encompasses claim of third party
who opposed discrimination).
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made no difference in a challenged adverse employment
decision?
Similar considerations extend to anti-retaliation
provisions—like those in the FMLA,267 the Employment
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA),268 the Fair Labor
Standards Act (FLSA),269 or the Occupation Safety and
Health Act (OSHA),270—that protect the assertion of
employee rights other than not being subjected to status
discrimination. Whether such provisions protect general
reasonable opposition to practices that their statute
otherwise prohibits, or instead only protect employee
participation in the formal processes established to
implement the statute, Congress also can and should clarify
the applicability of contributing causation, either by simple
amendments to the provisions or by a definition of operative
words such as “because” or “for.”271
267. 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2), (b) (2006).
268. 29 U.S.C. §1140 (2006).
269. 29 U.S.C. § 215(A)(3) (2006).
270. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(1) (2006).
271. Legislation was introduced in October, 2009, in both Houses of Congress
“to ensure that the standard for proving unlawful disparate treatment under
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 and other antidiscrimination and anti-retaliation laws is no different than the standard for
making such a proof under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, including
amendments made by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.” S. 1756, 111th Cong. § 2(b)
(2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. § 2(b) (2009) (emphasis added). The legislation
would adopt a “motivating factor” causation standard not only for age
discrimination, but also for retaliation proscribed by the ADEA. Moreover, it
extends this standard to “any Federal law forbidding employment
discrimination” or “forbidding . . . retaliation against an individual for engaging
in, or interference with, any federally protected activity including the exercise of
any right established by Federal law (including a whistleblower law).” The
legislation would also prevent any judicial reinvigoration of the direct evidence
distinction by clarifying that a “plaintiff may rely on any type or form of
admissible circumstantial or direct evidence and need only produce evidence
sufficient for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that a violation . . . occurred.”
S. 1756, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009); H.R. 3721, 111th Cong. § 3 (2009). In order to
ensure adequate incentives to private attorneys to press cases based on
contributing causation, Congress also should clarify in any provisions offering
employers “same decision” defenses to monetary or reinstatement remedies that
the award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs is not discretionary. See
supra note 11 and cases cited therein. For a proposal to impose additional
penalties for employers and add additional incentives for plaintiffs to bring
cases, see Martin J. Katz, The Fundamental Incoherence of Title VII: Making
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B. Pretext Evidence and Contributing Cause
Some reasonable skeptics, though supportive of the §
107 policy balance, might oppose the enactment of a
comprehensive contributing causation standard because of
doubts that it fits well with proof through pretext evidence.
Such skeptics might argue that contributing cause is an
inappropriate standard for cases in which the plaintiff’s
evidence of the existence of discriminatory bias is
inadequate to convince a reasonable jury that such bias was
a factor in the challenged adverse employment decision. If
such evidence is inadequate, then the plaintiff must depend
on pretext evidence demonstrating that the employer’s
proffered justification was false or at least insufficient, and
such pretext evidence is only convincing if adequate to prove
that there was some other necessary cause of the decision.272
This argument, however, by bifurcating the assessment
of the adequacy of a plaintiff’s evidence, ignores the
possibility that the two types of proof could be adequate
together, but each insufficient alone, to convince a
reasonable jury that discriminatory bias was a motivating
factor in an employment decision. Assume that a plaintiff’s
evidence of the existence of discriminatory bias could
convince a reasonable jury that it was only forty percent
likely that such bias played any role in a challenged
employment decision. This may be the case, for instance,
because of uncertainties about what a supervisor meant by
her references to the plaintiff’s ethnicity and about whether
the supervisor had any influence on the decision. Assume
further that the plaintiff also has evidence to call into
question the employer’s justification for the decision. Say,
for instance, the employer’s justification is the employee’s
attendance record, and the plaintiff shows that another
employee with a different ethnicity but a similar attendance
record was treated differently. Assume, however, that this
evidence of pretext is flawed because the other employee’s
attendance record was somewhat better or because the
Sense of Causation in Disparate Treatment Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 489, 537-49
(2006). Adoption of Professor Katz’s proposal of course would change the balance
struck by Congress in § 107 of the 1991 Act.
272. See Kaminshine, supra note 219, at 42-47 (presenting an argument for
retaining the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine framework as a separate method of
proof after Desert Palace).

2010]

THE CAUSATION STANDARD

141

other employee was in a somewhat different position of
responsibility, so that a reasonable jury could conclude that
it was only forty percent likely that the employer’s
attendance-related justification was pretextual. In this case,
although each type of evidence is inadequate alone to
convince a reasonable jury that discriminatory bias was a
motivating factor, together they could be sufficient to
convince a reasonable jury that it is likely that
discriminatory bias was a motivating factor.
Understanding why this is true requires understanding
what each type of evidence has demonstrated. A reasonable
jury’s calculation that plaintiff’s evidence of discriminatory
bias made the existence of discriminatory motivation only
forty percent likely does not mean that this evidence
necessarily would make the absence of such motivation at
least sixty percent likely to a reasonable jury. Given the
plaintiff’s burden of proof on the existence of discriminatory
motivation, it may only mean that nothing could be
determined from this evidence about the other sixty
percent. Since the plaintiff’s evidence concerning the
likelihood of pretext applies to the unknown sixty percent,
however, as well as the proven forty percent chance, the
plaintiff’s evidence of pretext can be interpreted by a
reasonable jury to add a twenty-four percent (forty percent
times sixty percent) likelihood that the challenged decision
had some other cause such as discriminatory bias.273
273. The reasonableness of such an interpretation in many cases is supported
by an inference that the employer’s offer of a pretextual justification indicates
that the employer was trying to cover up something illegitimate like the
discriminatory bias suggested by other evidence. Professor Katz indeed has
argued that proof of pretext alone, even when not supplemented by evidence of
discriminatory bias, can prove contributing causation without proving but-for
causation because such proof disproves only the justification(s) offered by the
defendant, not other possible non-discriminatory contributing motivations. See
Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109,
134-38 (2007). This argument, however, goes too far. Any proof of pretext,
including proof that the employer is lying intentionally, only is a basis alone for
an inference of the existence of another particular motivation to the extent that
it tends to prove the insufficiency (though not the total absence, contrary to
Professor Katz) of all other plausible motivations, and where all other motives
are insufficient, as a matter of logic the remaining motive of discrimination
must be necessary (though again contrary to Professor Katz, not sufficient
alone). See id. at 141. A plaintiff may be able to convince a reasonable fact finder
of the necessary existence of a discriminatory motive by proving only that the
defendant has lied about one of several proffered legitimate motives, but only
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This example of course does not demonstrate that
evidence of discriminatory bias close to being adequate
alone to prove discriminatory motivation to a reasonable
jury is always adequate to do so in conjunction with
evidence that is almost adequate alone to prove pretext to a
reasonable jury. In some cases, for instance, plaintiff’s
evidence of discriminatory bias is inadequate not only
because of the kind of uncertainties noted above, but
because of defendant’s countervailing evidence, such as of
its disproportionately good treatment of members of
plaintiff’s protected class or of other favorable decisions
from the challenged decision maker, that indicate the actual
absence of discriminatory motive, rather than merely show
that its presence has not been proven. In such cases, as
acknowledged by the Court in Reeves, even evidence of
pretext that is adequate to convince a reasonable jury that
the employer’s proffered reason was false might be
insufficient to convince such a jury of the existence of
discriminatory motivation.274
The example does demonstrate, however, that Congress
must respond carefully to the Gross decision to ensure that
the courts do not use a distinction between the two types of
plaintiffs’ evidence identified by the Court in Burdine as a
basis for weighing the types of evidence separately.
Congress should prevent this bifurcation by clarifying under
Title VII, as well as under other employment laws, that
there are not two separate kinds of disparate treatment
causes of action. A bifurcation of evidence, when assessing
through the inference that the lie regarding the one motive proves the
insufficiency of the others. Thus, in cases where plaintiffs have only evidence of
pretext and do not have even weak evidence of discriminatory bias, it is
appropriate to avoid unnecessary burden-shifting instructions to the jury.
274. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). The
Court stated:
[T]here will be instances where, although the plaintiff has established a
prima facie case and set forth sufficient evidence to reject the
defendant’s explanation, no rational factfinder could conclude that the
action was discriminatory. For instance, an employer would be entitled
to judgment as a matter of law if the record conclusively revealed some
other, nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision, or if the
plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the employer’s
reason was untrue and there was abundant and uncontroverted
independent evidence that no discrimination had occurred.
Id.
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either a defendant’s motion to deny a trial or jury
consideration or a defendant’s motion to reject a jury’s
verdict, may deny at least some plaintiffs the benefit
promised by the 1991 Act and confirmed by Desert Palace—
the benefit of being able to demonstrate disparate treatment
by proving motivating factor causation to juries.275
The example also confirms that the adoption of the
§ 107 policy balance for any statute should mean that
whenever a plaintiff survives summary judgment and offers
some evidence of an illegal bias, requests for the kind of jury
instruction upheld in Desert Palace—including an
instruction on the defendant’s opportunity to limit remedies
by showing the absence of necessary causation—should be
granted. Even if a plaintiff’s evidence of pretext is
sufficiently strong alone to convince a reasonable jury of the
existence of a proscribed motive, a judge cannot be certain
that any additional evidence of a proscribed discriminatory
or retaliatory bias was not critical to a jury’s finding of
liability against a defendant. Given the plaintiff’s burden of
proof, evidence sufficient to convince a reasonable jury that
there was a ninety percent chance of pretext does not force a
jury to find pretext and, by inference, illegal motivation.
Thus, it is logically consistent for a jury presented with
evidence both of pretext and of illegal bias to find
contributing causation but no necessary causation.
As acknowledged above, 276 where the plaintiff’s relevant
evidence, including any evidence that the court deems part
275. Apparently because he does not appreciate how proof that may not be
adequate to demonstrate pretext nonetheless may help convince reasonable
people of the existence of a discriminatory motive, Professor Kaminshine
supports the bifurcation of plaintiffs’ evidence in his defense of the courts’ use of
a but-for causation standard through the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
framework. See Kaminshine, supra note 214, at 51-60. Although he
acknowledges that Reeves requires the consideration of evidence of bias to prove
pretext under a necessary causation standard, he claims that elements of
evidence “which are insufficient by themselves to establish an unlawful motive .
. . have no probative value” combined with pretext proof under the motivating
factor, contributory causation standard. Id. at 51, 59. Contrary to Professor
Kaminshine’s concerns, combining all evidence under the causation standard
chosen by Congress in § 107 does not “risk[ ] a finding of unlawful motive on
insufficient evidence,” because reasonable jurors can infer the existence of a
discriminatory motive from the combination of different types of evidence that
would be insufficient if considered alone. Id. at 59-60.
276. See supra text accompanying notes 218-22.
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of some prima facie case, only concerns the absence of
legitimate justifications for the challenged decision, rather
than the bias of the decision makers, the Desert Palace
instruction appropriately can be modified to require the
proof of necessary causation through pretext, thus obviating
the need of any employer proof of the absence of such
causation. In such a case, and only in such a case, a court
might instruct the jury that the plaintiff must prove that
discriminatory bias, rather than the employer’s proffered
legitimate motive, caused the challenged adverse
employment decision. A court in such a case might also
deny a motion from either the plaintiff or the defendant for
a “same decision” instruction regarding remedies.277
Allowing courts such discretion, however, does not
require limiting the reach of a § 107 policy balance. The
policy balance, and the motivating factor causation
standard for liability under that balance, still applies even
in cases where all of plaintiff’s evidence is only relevant to
the proof of pretext. The modified jury instruction simply
recognizes the logical impossibility in such cases of proving
contributing causation without also proving necessary
causation.
CONCLUSION
Congress should meet the challenge to federal
employment law posed by the Court’s decision in Gross, not
as it met the Court’s Price Waterhouse decision two decades
earlier, by enacting a reactive provision for only the statute
addressed in the decision. Instead, Congress should
consider broadly the issue of causation for all employment
law provisions, including those in Title VII, that prohibit
conduct based on motivation. Such consideration should
include weighing the difficulty of untangling complicated
277. As stated in the Ninth Circuit’s en banc opinion in Desert Palace, if the
“trial court determines that the only reasonable conclusion[s] a jury could reach
is that discriminatory animus is the sole cause . . . or that discrimination played
no role at all,” then the jury should be instructed to determine whether the
plaintiff has proven that the challenged action was taken “‘because of’ the
prohibited reason,” and the defendant “does not benefit from the ‘same decision’
defense.” Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 856 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc), aff’d, 539 U.S. 90 (2003). Otherwise, a mixed motive instruction that
specifies both the motivating factor causation standard and the “same decision”
defense is required.
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and intertwined motivations and of proving the existence of
conscious and unconscious bias. It also should include
consideration of the purpose and limitations of the pretext
proof facilitated by the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
framework, especially in light of the reality of employees
with imperfect records. Perhaps most importantly, the
consideration must include a review, like that provided in
this Article, of the resistance of the courts to a full
replacement of a contributing causation standard and to a
reduction of the role of the McDonnell Douglas-Burdine
framework.
Such broad consideration should lead a Congress
committed to the goals of the federal employment antidiscrimination statutes to clarify the causation standard for
disparate treatment litigation in all these statutes, not just
for the ADEA interpreted in Gross. Given the courts’
resistance to a broad interpretation of § 107, this
clarification must encompass Title VII. To be
comprehensive, it should also encompass the antiretaliation provisions in the full range of federal
employment
statutes.
Whether
through
clarifying
modifications of the provisions expressing mandates against
intentional discrimination or retaliation, or through new
definitions of “because” and related terms, Congress should
make its voice resonate loudly to a judiciary that has
resisted dialogue.

